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Abstract
Germany has recently extended its national membership, seen by the 1999 reform
of its 1913 citizenship law, which bound citizenship to notions of ethnicity, language and
a common German destiny. In addition, after much political deliberation, the Federal
Republic adopted the country's first ever immigration law in 2004 . This extension of
national membership represents a radical change from previous governmental policy, in
that Germany has declared itself to now be a 'country of immigration'. These changes to
the status-quo inevitably brought expectations of results, namely hopes ofa higher
naturalization rate of the country's large foreign population. Both the policymakers' and
the foreigners' expectations, for the most part, have not been met. This study is an
examination of the results of the 1999 citizenship reform and looks at possible factors
that may have contributed to the gap between the expectations and the outcomes of the
new law . It posits that the Federal Republic's political institutions, along with German
society's understanding of itself as an ethno-cultural entity, were the two most influential
factors in producing this gap . .
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"A 'German' in the meaning ofthis Basic Law. subject to other regulation. is a person
who possesses German citizenship" (Article J16. Basic Law (Constitutions).

Chapter 1- National Membership: the past trends and present circumstances in
Germany

1.1 The Issue-The case ofCittzenship in Germany
There are more than seven million foreigners in Germany. With a populace of 82
million, individuals with no German citizenship represent nine percent of the total
population and until the recent leveling off of this number, the figure was growing
annually. I In 1996, it was estimated that if the current trends remained constant, close to
17 percent of the total population would be foreigners by the year 2030 (Green, 200 1 (a):
29). Furthermore, 1996 data show that 40 percent of foreigners had lived in Germany for
at least 15 years 2 (Hagedorn, 2001: 115), the necessary amount of time required to apply
for Germany citizenship, yet approximately only four percent of the country's foreign
population received citizenship in the course of that same year (Bundesamt fur Migration
und Fluchtlinge, 2004: 86). Of these four percent, more than half of the naturalizations
took place within the Aussiedler population, or in other words, the ethnic Germans
coming mostly from Russia who have easy and direct access to citizenship based on their
ethnic origin.' In reality then, less than two percent of the foreign population was being
naturalized in the years preceding 1996.
There was, and still is, however, no shortage of individuals that qualify for
naturalization; 48 percent of foreigners in 1996 qualified to apply for citizenship (Green,
2001(a): 35), although in the same year, only a little more than 86 000 foreigners. or less
See Appendix 1 for number of foreigner population since 1980.
Set; Appendix 2 for complete data on length of stay of foreigners in Germany as of 2003
3 According to Article 116 of the German Basic Law (constitution). individuals of ethnic German descent
have the rigbllo take up residence in the Federal Republic.
I

1
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than 1.2 percent, acquired German citizenship (Bundesamt fUr Migration und Fluchtlinge,
2004: 87). A 2000 study found that 57 percent-of adult foreigners had interest in
4

acquiring a German passport, although closer to two percent received it. In comparison
to other countries, the Federal Republic has extremely low levels of naturalization.
Canada had a naturalization rate of 68.2 percent for the 1.2 million immigrants that came
between 1991-95 and 39.1 percent for the 0.4 million immigrants that landed in 1996-97,
and there are few second generation foreigners in the country.i In the USA and France,
the naturalization rate of people who have been in the country for 15 years is closer to 20
percent. Germany, on the other hand, seems to be a black sheep within the western world
with regards to its much lower rate of naturalization.
This lower rate was explained by Germany's granting of citizenship only to ethnic
Germans, only through blood descent or to foreigners who had legally resided in the
country for at least fifteen years, a very long period in comparison to other nation-states,
and the high cost of the naturalization process. When the first wave of foreigners entered
the country after WWII, the Federal Republic did not think of integrating them into
German society, as the foreigners represented a small portion of the total population and,
more importantly perhaps, were thought to be temporary residents. Furthermore, the
meaning of being 'German' was still very much tied to notions of ethnicity and language.
Thus, there was no discussion within Germany to reform the naturalization guidelines.
These naturalization guidelines were not completely revamped until very recently.
First of all, until the 1999 reform, the Federal Republic's conservative citizenship law
dated back to 1913. Furthermore, onJy last year, with the adoption of the country's first
4 See Marplan-Srudie, Vgl. MARPLAN: Auslaender in Deutschland 2000 .
s A 2004 Statistics Canada study suggests that the countries of origin of immigrations may explain the
varying rate of naturalization (Statistics Canada, 2004)

5

ever immigration law, did Germany officially declare itself to be a country of
immigration, reversing what had been the Government's official 'the Federal Republic is
not a country of immigration' policy. Germany's peer countries, such as France and the
USA, never made such declarations of not being countries of immigration, although they
experienced similar migration trends. Rather, they have adopted a national policy of
accepting immigration as an important part of their national identity. For Germany, then,
the past few years have brought a paradigm shift within the political world, from one of
tolerating foreigners as guests to accepting them as part of German society; national
membership, in the form of a reform of the citizenship law and an immigration law, albeit
not as liberal as originally intended, has been extended to the foreign population. This is a
radical change from previous governmental policy.

1.2 - Goal ofthe Study: Divergence between goals and outcomes
Even though there has been a far-reaching transformation in the Federal
Republic's official rhetoric vis-a-vis foreigners, the tangible results within the foreign
population have had limited and incremental, at best, results: the naturalization rate, after
the adoption of the 1999 citizenship reform, still sits below two percent. 6 The goal of this
study is to identify the factors that have contributed to the discrepancy between stated
citizenship policy and actual outcome. Cornelius and Tsuda (2004) propose a "gap
hypothesis", stating that "significant and persistent gaps exist between official
immigration policies and actual policy outcomes" (Cornelius and Tsuda, 2004: 4).
Similarly to immigration policies, the reform of the citizenship law in Germany presents
a case where a sizeable difference between the original governmental goals and what has

6

The dam concerning naturalization since the adoption of the reform will be explored in Chapter 2.
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occurred since the law has come into effect exists. Naturalization and immigration,
understood as areas of policy in which the government has specific quantitative and
qualitative goals, and in many cases, in which the policies diverge with the results, can be
analyzed correspondingly. This study will use Cornelius and Tsuda's notion of the 'gap
t

hypothesis' in immigration policy to identify the contributing factors to the goals
outcome gap in Germany's recent citizenship reform.
Policy implementation
Cornelius and Tsuda suggest that policy gaps can result due to poor
implementation or enforcement of the policies, or due to unintended results of them. Poor
implementation, in the case of the 1999 reform, could be attributed to a lack of
publication of the law in order to encourage foreigners to naturalize. It could also be
ascribed to the ruling Red-Green coalition not having enough political will to effectively
execute the required changes. For example, a goal of the reform was to make
naturalization easier. In order to accomplish this, the formerly complicated bureaucratic
process would need to be simplified. However, if no effort is exerted to implement
change within the bureaucracy, the desired results will most probably not occur.
Another reason for a poor implementation may be that policymakers have relied
on a flawed process to develop the law, meaning that outside information was Dot well
enough examined before the drafting of the law. Citizenship reform is not unique to
Germany; other European countries, Sweden for example, have recently also modified its
policies. Poor implementation could then result if the information from outside countries

was not adequately studied.
Unintended consequences/poor understanding of target group's wishes
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Unintended results, another proposed reason for the gap, of policies of the reform
have not been seen until very recently. The recent case of Turkish citizens naturalizing in
Germany, therefore giving up their Turkish passport, and then going to Turkey to regain
Turkish nationality without informing German officials is one such unintended result. It
will be some time before more results show themselves, most notably when the children
born to foreigners reach the ages of 18~23, when they have to decide which of their
nationalities to keep.
Unintended results may also appear if the policymakers do not understand the
target group's, the foreigners in the case of the citizenship reform, desires . Many
organizations representing foreign nationals, both politically and socially, exist in the
Federal Republic, that could potentially offer valuable information about foreigners to the
policymakers. However, if the foreigners' wishes are not well known or stated to the
policymakers, they may consequently draft a law that is inadequate according to the
target group.
Public pressure/domestic public pressure
Another contributing factor to the gap can be the public pressure of the country
juxtaposed with international pressures. International conventions, such as the United
Nations' Convention on the Rights of Migrants may exert some stress on countries to
liberalize their policies with respects to migrants. Sassen (1998), among others, maintains
that international human rights limits national sovereignty. However, this pressure to
liberalize from outside the national borders may be countered by a public pressure not
open to foreigners .

8

Related to this, Joppke (1998) suggests that there is domestic pressure on the
government, limiting the state's sovereignty, which may explain the gap between stated
policies and actual outcomes by explaining why governments may not be fully committed
to implementing their policies. If the government states goals that are not well accepted
within society, there may be pressure from within the country to ensure that the goals are
not met. The campaign against dual citizenship in Germany before the 1998 Federal
elections can be seen as domestic pressure.
Another example supporting the domestic pressure hypothesis is seen with a
glance at the history of the guest workers. Throughout the 1960s and 19705, foreigners in
Germany were viewed by Germans as workers, hence contributors to the economy. They
were thus regarded as positive members of society. However, the economic depression in
the early 19905 and the even more recent economic strains in the Federal Republic have
led to immigrants being perceived as inactive, and thus a burden (Schonwaelder 1996).
The higher unemployment of foreigners compared to German nationals undoubtedly
plays a role in this shift of perceptions within German society.' In addition, the historical
conception of German national identity has been based on an ethno-cultural foundation.i
and the integration of foreigners is a relatively new policy in Germany and one that has
not yet been fully accepted within society. Thus, by keeping an official anti-immigration
rhetoric, the government was able to placate its population even though economically
needed immigrants still enter the country. With respect to the 1999 reform and the 2004
Immigration Law, the Government has changed. its rhetoric to one of Germany being a
country of immigration. However, since the German public may not entirely accept this

7
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See Appendix 4 for data concerning unemployment.
For an excellent analysis of this notion, see Brubaker (I992).
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paradigm shift, the Government may use its actions, in the form ofmaintaining low
naturalization rates, to stay in favor with the public: Germany may be a country of
immigration, but by pointing at the low naturalization rates, the Government can show
the public that foreigners are remaining foreigners. It is then the public pressure that
determines whether or not there is a gap.
Client groups
Freeman (1995) echoes Joppke in that he maintains there are domestic pressures,
naming them 'client politics'. However, unlike Joppke, these client politics do not
originate from within the bulk of society, but rather from smaller lobbying groups. These
can include powerful employer groups, religious groups and pro-immigration groups,
pressuring the government to grant foreigners more rights. Freeman discusses
immigration rather than citizenship. However, his discussion is nevertheless relevant
because be maintains that efforts from client groups can have a backlash. If the general
public opinion turns against the Government granting more rights , the governmental
policies are then watered down, as Joppke suggests, and the Government will not be fully
committed to them. Hansen and Weil (2002) maintain that pro-immigration groups are
active in pressuring European Union institutions to promote the extension of social rights
to foreigners, suggesting that the state's sovereignty may be limited by 'client groups'. In
the German citizenship case, client groups, such as the Turkish Community which is the
biggest foreigner association in the country, may not have much influence in comparison
to the general public opinion, as the latter, ifmobilized, represents a much larger segment
of society. It should be noted that foreigners in the Federal Republic have largely not
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been well-integrated into society, thus are often perceived as being opposed to the general,
larger public.
Structure of political institutions .
Another explanation of a gap in policy and outcomes specific to Germany places
shortcomings of policy on the institutional structure in Germany, namely the coalition
government and intergovernmental relations. Katzenstein (1987) and Dyson (1982) write
that these institutional factors lead to incremental results in Germany. Intergovernmental
relations refer to the fact that the Bundestag must reach agreement with the states,
represented in the Bundesrat, before any law that affects the Under is passed. A coalition
government in a multiparty system often needs to reach compromises among coalition
partners before a bill has a chance to be adopted. In addition, the Federal Republic has a
system of ongoing state (Landtag) elections. These can thus change the composition of
the Bundesrat during the Federal Government's term in office, which often forces it to
seek a broad consensus. Thus, policy failures ~ould appear due to Government's inability
to counteract the effects of the system in which it exercises power.
Figure 1.1 - Possible contributors to gap between goals and outcomes
Possible contributors
Structure of political institutions

Public pressure/domestic public pressure

Client groups
Policy implementation

Examples specific to 1999 Reform
Loss of Bundesrat majority led to the need
to compromise and to a watered-down
version of the original proposal
Anti-dual citizenship campaign in Hesse
leading to the loss of the Red-Green
coalition's majority in the Bundesrat;
paradigm shift has not yet been accepted by
German public
Weak lobbying power
Not enough publicity of the reform leading
to the lack of awareness within the foreign
population; Lack of political will to
implement necessary policy changes
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Unintended consequences/poor
understanding of target group wishes

Option model: will children of foreign
parents born in Germany decide to keep the
German passport?

1.3 Background - The evolution ofpast citizenship policy in the Federal Republic
A quick glance at the history of citizenship in Germany sheds light on its
evolution in the course of the past century, for it should be noted that the revamping of
the citizenship law in 1999 was not the first attempt to provide more adequate guidelines
to naturalizing foreigners in the country. The first national policy on citizenship was
inscribed in the 1913 Citizenship Law (Reichs- und Staatsangehorigkeitsgesetz) in which
citizenship was granted based on descent rather than on a republican notion that had
arisen out of the French revolution. The German nation-state was relatively new, Bismark
had unified the regions of the German. Reich under the hegemony of Prussia only in 1871,
and regional fragmentation still existed between the different realms of the territory. Thus,
since the empire was founded on the loose conception of a Kulturnation, implying that
identity was based on a common culture, language and destiny, it seemed. logical to use
the same notion in granting citizenship, and at the same time exclude non-ethnic Germans:
UIn addition to binding civil rights to the principle of ethnic descent, the law of 1913
aimed to prolong German citizenship for German emigrants and to limit the acquisition
of German citizenship by foreigners to exceptional cases" (Bade, 1997: 17).
So prevalent was the idea of a common culture that needed to be kept intact that
the Reich Migration Office, later renamed. the Reich Emigration Agency, attempted to
persuade Germans not to emigrate (Bade, 1997:18). Furthermore, theoreticians argued
that if emigration had to occur, its destination should be South instead of North America,
for those countries were deemed as culturally and economically poorer. Hence, German
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emigrants, with the superior culture, would not be assimilated and retain their culture and
language, and consequently then, their attachment to the German Reich.
This law, which originally aimed at including all ethnic Germans, even the ones
who had emigrated, as well as excluding the increasing number of immigrants, mostly
Poles, who were senling into the rapidly industrializing Ruhr region, was not changed
during the Weimar Republic. Furthermore, not only did it survive the National-Socialist
era in Germany, but its emphasis on a common unique German culture and destiny was
utilized by the Nazis, who then added their own racist citizenship laws (Lemke, 2001 : 5).
These latter laws were dropped at the founding of the Federal Republic in 1949, but the
1913 citizenship law remained in force. To it were two provisions were added in the
Basic Law, namely the granting citizenship to any individual who had been stripped of it
during the Nazi rule and to anyone "who has been admitted to the territory of the German
Reich within the boundaries of December 31, 1937 as a refugee or expellee of German
ethnic origin or as the spouse or descendant of such person" (German Basic Law, Article
116). Hence, the continuity of defining the nation along ethnic lines entailed that all
Germans living in the Eastern communist bloc were also entitled to citizenship in the
Federal Republic.
The demographics in West Germany in the following decades challenged the
notion of this ethno-cultural citizenship. In the late 1950s and early 19605, in the midst of
its 'economic miracle', the Federal Republic recruited and welcomed a host of guest
workers; bilateral agreements were made with the governments of Italy (1955), Greece
and Spain (1960), Turkey (1961), Morocco (1963), Portugal (1964), Tunisia (1965) and
Yugoslavia (1968). The German government's initial intentions were to allow male guest
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workers to work for a year or two before returning to their country of origin. The guest
workers took, to a large extent, were unskilled, thus their income placed them in the
Federal Republic's lower income strata. There was a rotation of guest workers so that
none would firmly establish themselves in the country. For the foreigners, it was a good
opportunity to make money; West Germany's economy was booming and the attractive
wages would permit them to return to their families in their countries of origin within a
short period of time. It was also supposed to be a mutually beneficial relationship for the
Federal Republic, as the guest workers would be paying more in taxes and into pension
plans than the Government expected to have to return to them in the long run . The events,
however, did not unfold as planned. There was pressure from German employers in 1962 .
and 1963, after the important source of labor from East Germany was officially cut off in
the early 19505 and effectively halted after the erection of the Berlin Wall in 1961, to
abolish the two-year limit the guest workers had initially been permitted to stay. Thus,
more workers came, stayed for a longer period of time and eventually members of their
family joined them in Germany."
Amidst a recession in 1973, Germany officially put a halt to the recruitment of
guest workers (Anwerbestopp) and economic hardship in the following years fomented
increased anti-guest worker feelings. However, the foreigners had effectively become
members of society, although, to a large extent, segregated from the Germans. Thus, the
Government tentatively adopted the Guidelines on Naturalizations
iEinbtlrgerungsrichtltnten) in December of 1977. Whereas in the past, the individual
Lander had much discretion in implementing the 1913 law that allowed for very little
naturalization, the 1977 guidelines, not an official law, attempted to give, for the first
9

See Appendix 3 for data on number of foreigners and country of origin .
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time, national, clear criteria that could be fulfilled to acquire German citizenship.
However, even though criteria were established, merely fulfilling requirements did not
guarantee naturalization because "the granting of German citizenship can only be
considered if a public interest in the naturalization exists [...]; the personal desires and
economic interests of the applicant cannot be decisive" (1977 Guidelines on

Naturalizations in Duyvene de Wit and Koopman, 2005: 6).
These official 1977 guidelines, resulting from negotiation between the SPDIFDP
Government and the CDU-dominated upper house of the time, were supposed to direct
the decisions for naturalization: if the prerequisites, such as the fifteen year residency
period, were fulfilled, it still needed to be in the 'public interest' for a foreigner to be
granted citizenship. However, since a section of the 1977 Guidelines on Naturalization
reads "the Federal Republic of Germany is not a country of immigration; it does not seek
to increase the number of its citizens through naturalization" (Green, 2004: 40), it was
perceived that naturalizing foreigners was not in the 'public interest.' Individuals could
then, by 1977, in practice satisfy the requirements, but Germany was not ready to change
the definition of its membership based on ethno-culturallines, and consequently, was
reluctant to naturalize its growing foreign population. Further demonstrating that
Germany was unwilling to grant citizenship to foreigners was the extremely high fee
needed, often exceeding 2000 DM, to file a request, which was not refunded even if
naturalization was denied. In addition, and important in the context of the 1999 Reform,
is that foreigners were required to relinquish their previous citizenship before becoming a
naturalized German.

15

The Law on Foreigners (Ausldndergesetz) of 1991 was the next attempt by the
Federal Republic to address the issue of its growing foreign popuJation in the wake of
unification. The 1991 law included provisions attempting to adequately modernize the
citizenship process, and offered new avenues by which to acquire citizenship. These
provisions constituted only a fraction of the law, and the 1991 law was therefore not a
successor to the 1913 citizenship law still in force. The stipulations concerning
citizenship were passed in the Bundestag in large part because of the repercussions of the
fall of the Berlin Wall; the many foreigners seemed just as 'German' as the former East
Germans after having lived under different circumstances for so many years. Furthermore,
it was not seen as tenable, in a liberal country, to refuse citizenship to the already large
foreign population. This was embodied in the new and more liberal Interior Minister,
Wolfgang Schauble of the CDU; although his party did not encourage the extension of
citizenship nor the recruitment of foreigners, his appointment to the interior ministry in
1989 led directly to the liberalization of the law and brought the integration of foreigners,
albeit not as a major theme, to the CDU policy agenda. Nevertheless, even if the 1991
law brought a threefold increase in naturalizations with its lower costs and special
provisions for individuals between the ages of 16-24, adult foreigners still needed have
lived in Germany 15 years before applying. In addition, it is suggested that the
complicated application process discouraged most immigrants from applying for
citizenship. Furthermore, recent "research in Germany has indicated that the most
important factor - beyond bureaucratic delay and hassle - explaining the Turks' low
naturalization rate is their legal inability to retain their Turkish nationality when acquiring
a German passport" (Hanson and Weil, 2002: 17). Thus, there seems to have been some
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modernization of the citizenship issue in Germany seen by the increase in the
naturalization rate. 10 However, even when increased, the naturalization rate was low,
which entailed that the vast majority of Germans were still ethnically defined. In addition,
the low naturalization rate clearly demonstrates that some important concerns, such as the
dual citizenship question, had failed to be addressed in order for the German citizenship
to be attractive to foreigners in the country.
During the economic boom of the 19605, the general population had not perceived
these foreign workers as a problem, believing that they would temporarily be in the
country. However, in a 1983 poll, 80 percent of West Germans said they desired the
departure of foreign workers. It is to be noted that the unemployment rate in 1983 was 9.1
percent, compared to 3.8 percent just three years earlier (Nathans, 2004: 244). The
Federal Government adopted a stance of encouraging the foreigners to depart from the
country. Since the Lander governments had, to a large extent, the discretion to grant or
deny renewal of working and residence permits, the realities of guest workers varied from
state to state; some states offered monetary remuneration if guest workers left the country,
while others made it difficult for family members to join the guest workers in Germany,
Very few foreigners left Germany despite the Government's efforts. In fact, the foreign
population grew annually with family reunification schemes, and soon. a second
generation of foreigners was born on German soil. It is interesting to note that within the
foreign population in Germany today, the largest populations represent countries from
which guest workers were recruited. The reality was clearer than in 1977 when the
Naturalization Guidelines were adopted and even more obvious than in 1991 when easier
provisions for naturalizations were passed: foreigners were going to stay in Germany, and
10 See

Chapter 2.2 The realities since J999 for complete data on naturalization.
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furthermore, due mostly to low birth rates among the German population, the Federal
Republic was in need of them.
The reality of the presence of guest workers was not the only factor to have
changed the reality of German society. Asylum seekers, especially at the start of the
1990s, arrived in the Federal Republic in considerable numbers, and was a second aspect
putting to test the notion of Germany not being a country of immigration; other than the
former guest workers and their descendants, this new group of foreigners was noticeable
to the rest of society. Their entrance into the country was principally the result of the
German constitution. Article 16a of the Basic Law stipulates that individuals suffering
persecution on political grounds have the right of asylum in the Federal Republic if they
did not travel through a safe country before arriving on German soil. There were 78 760
asylum applications in 2000, of which 13.5 percent were granted refugee status (BBe
News, February 6,2001). This has been drastically reduced since the 1990-92 period,
during which close to 900 000 individuals sought refuge in the Federal Republic.
Although a small fraction of all applications are granted the right to stay in Federal
Republic, the total number is significant, and the backlog in applications as well as the
long application period means that many asylum seekers remain in the country for several
years. This has forced both German citizens and policy makers to recognize them along
with the guest workers and their families as part of German society. Whereas foreigners
represented 4.3 percent of the population in 1970, this percentage has grown to 7.6 in
1982,8.0 in 1992 and 8.9 in 2002 (Statistisches Bundesarnt, 2003).11 Walking the streets

11 It

is to be noted that Germany before 1990 is understood here as West Germany. However, it should also

be noted that foreigners represent less than two percent of the former East Germany, and that East Germany
itself accounts for approximately 18 percent of the total German population. Thus, German unification on
October 3, 1990, has little effect OD percentage of foreigners in Germany,
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in Berlin, Hamburg or Frankfurt, it is impossible not to see the heterogeneity of the multi
cultural populace. However, the past governments had not adopted policies favorable to
the integration of foreigners into the wider German society, which was a reality that was
challenged with the election of a new Government in the 1998 federal elections.

Figure 1.2 - Important dates in the evolution of German citizenship policy
1871
1913
1919-1933
1933-1945

1949
1955
1973
1977

1991

1999

The German Reich is founded.
First ever citizenship law based on Kulturnation and ethnic descent is
adopted; very few provisions for naturalization exist.
The Weimar Republic comes and falls; no change in citizenship policy.
Nazism in Germany; the ethno-cultural basis of the 1913 law, along with
new racial citizenship laws, is used by Hitler's regime to solidify idea of
the 'pure' German nation.
The Federal Republic is founded; citizenship policy remains unchanged,
but is extended to all ethnic Germans not living in the territory.
West Germany signs its first of multiple bilateral agreements to recruit
guest workers.
Amidst a recession, the recruitment of guest worker is officially put to a
end.
The Guidelines on Naturalizations are passed, offering minor provisions
for the granting of citizenship to foreigners; the 1913 citizenship law
remains in force . Very few foreigners naturalize.
The Law on Foreigners is passed, in which further provisions for granting
citizenship are present; the 1913 citizenship law remains in force. The
naturalization rate increases threefold but stays below two percent.
The 1913 citizenship law is reformed allowing for granting of citizenship
based on birthright.

1.4 Extension of national membership - the Reform to the Citizenship Law of 1999 and
the 2004 Immigration Law
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The new citizenship law came into existence when the SPD-Greens (German Social
Democratic Party-Green party)12 coalition took power in the Bundestag's 1998
September elections. This represented a watershed in German politics, as the so-called
Rot-Grim, or Red-Green, coalition, led by Gerhard Schroder, replaced the Helmut Kohl-

led CDU/CSU (Christian Democratic Union and Christian Socialist Union)/FDP (Free
Democratic Party) u govermnent. The former had been in power for the previous sixteen
years and its policies had been characterized by social conservatism. The new
government, on the other hand, placed social reform as essential to its agenda. Kohl's
social spending cuts attempting to rectify the budget .deficit and the unemployment of
more than four million Germans, a rate greater than 10 percent, had led to significant
discontent among the population. Schroder had different reforms in mind that included
less radical social cuts than Kohl
Schroder promised stability with his proposed reforms that Kohl had failed to
deliver during the last years. This stability included not only economic aspects, such as
maintaining Germany's 1.5 percent annual growth, nor merely political, such as retaining
a key position in the European integration process, but in addition, consisted of a very
important social aspect, namely facing the issue of foreigners in Germany.
The matter of foreigners was not one to be taken lightly, as there is a clear
distinction within society between the large second and third generation of foreigners in
the country with no German citizenship and the German citizens. Foreigners have higher
birth rates, 1.8 percent as compared to 1.4 percent for German mothers (Roloff and
12 In German, the SPD is the Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands and the Green Party's official name
is Btindnis 90/die Grunen. The acronym SPD and Greens, or Green Party will be used throughout this study.
13 In German, the federal CDU is the Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands, and its sister party
found only in Bavaria is the CSU, the Christlich Soziale Union Deutchlands. The FDP is the Freie
Demokratische Parlei. The acronyms will be used throughout this study.
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Schwarz, 2001). They also have higher unemployment rates (see Figure 1.1) and the
income difference between Germans and foreigners is growing (Auslanderbeauftragte,
2002: 315). In addition, the crime rate within the foreign population is more significant
compared to bearers of a German passport; in 2001 , 19.3 percent of criminal acts were
performed by foreigners (Auslanderbeauftragte 2002: 298), whereas they represent less
than ten percent of the population.

Figure 1.3 - Unemployment in Germany since 1979
Unemployment
Of foreigners
3.9
1979
4.8
3.5
1980
8.5
1981
5.4
7.5
11.8
1982
13.7
8.6
1983
8.6
12.7
1984
13.1
1985
8.7
8.2
13.0
1986
14.1
8.4
1987
13.9
1988
8.1
11.2
7.3
1989
10.1
6.6
1990
1991
6.0
10.6
12.3
1992
6.5
8.3
15.3
1993
8.8
15.5
1994
9.0
1995
16.2
10.0
1996
18.6
10.7
1997
19.7
9.8
18.3
1998
11.2
19.7
1999
Source: Bundesanstalt fttr Arbeit . Arbeitslosenquoten ausliindischer Arbeitnehmer nach
Herkunftsldndem. (Auslanderbeauftragte, 2001: Tabelle 33).
Year

German
Unemployment
3.2

These traits are not necessarily linked to citizenship, but the ruling Red-Green coalition
held the view that citizenship would help foreigners integrate into society, eroding the
distinction between those born of German parents and those born of non-German parents.
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The potential of having an even greater foreign population was worrisome to individuals
in both major political camps. For the left-of-center parties, the exclusion of foreigners
from participation in the federal elections was unfair and created a two-tiered society. For
right-of-center parties, the problem was more so the high percentage of non-Germans in
the country; it was ofutrnost importance to preserve the German culture, which the
conservatives perceived as being threatened by foreigners. In addition, with relatively
high unemployment in Germany, the right-of-center parties maintained that the Federal

Republic had attained a saturation point with regards to accepting more immigrants.
Furthermore.the anti-foreigner sentiment was on the rise in Germany and there
was fear of conflict within the country, especially if the percentage of foreigners kept
increasing as predicted. The year 2002 was the first in the last decade to have seen a
decrease in the number of extreme right organizations, although it was estimated that in
the same year, the number of individuals in organized nee-Nazi groups rose by fifteen
percent (Bundesministerium des Innem, 2003 : 32). The SPD regarded the reversal of the
poor integration policies of the past as central to their vision of 'stability' and recognized
that other European states granted citizenship more easily than Germany. As Otto Schily,
the German Interior Minister said, "With the new German citizenship law the previous
out-dated laws have been modernized and adapted to a European standard,,14 (Schily
speech, November 12, 1998). The European Union integration process added pressure to
Germany to harmonize its laws with its neighbors. The 1997 European Convention on
Nationality established "principles and rules relating to the nationality of natural persons
to which the intemallaw of States Parties shall conform" (Council of Europe, 1997: 3).

'4

European standard is understood as granting citizenship based on a mix ofjus sanguinis (right of blood)
andjus solis (place of birth). Both concepts are discussed in the next paragraphs.
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However, the real impetus was that Germany could no longer deny -the fact that
foreigners were going to remain in the country. The CDU/CSU's official position was
that the Federal Republic should not admit more immigrants and that Germany's 1913
Citizenship Law needed no amendment to help with the integration of foreigners already

in the country. Nevertheless, with a left of center party leading the government, it seemed
that Germany could finally come to terms with its foreign population and liberalize its
laws .
However, the initial proposal for the reform of the citizenship law differed greatly
from its final product. The Reform to the Citizenship Law of 1999 stipulates that the
required length oflegal residence in the country needed to apply for citizenship be
reduced from fifteen to eight years, and children born or raised in Germany who have
already been in the country for five years now qualify for German citizenship. Foreigners
married to a German citizen must now wait three instead of the previous five years before
applying for citizenship. The biggest reform concerns children born to foreign parents; if
at least one parent has lived in Germany for at least eight years and has a 'stable'
residence permit (right to stay (Aufenthaltsberechtigung) or unlimited residence permit

(Aufenthaltserlaubnisvi, the child automatically receives citizenship from the parents as
well as German citizenship. This was ground-breaking for Germany, whose 1913 law
was based only onjus sanguinis, blood descent. Thus, in the past, bearers of the German
passport had to have at least one German parent. This meant that citizenship was
intrinsically tied to ethnicity; to be German was to have a common heritage and a
common language. The reform challenges this notion by allowing for the granting of
citizenship based on the principle ofjus sanguinis as well as the principle ofjus soli, the
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granting of citizenship according to the place of birth. However, the individual must
decide between the ages of 18-23 which nationality to keep.
Dual citizenship had initially been proposed by the Green Party as integral to the
law, but the COU/CSU opposition campaigned hard against the allocation of it, arguing
that German citizenship would be devalued because bearers of two passports would have
divided loyalty, thus not regard German citizenship as highly as those individuals whose
sole attention could be devoted to German citizenship. Another objection to dual
citizenship was the fear that allowing it along with easier naturalization would lead to
increased immigration, which in not desirable according to the Union. Furthermore, the
CDU/CSU declared that individuals with more than one passport would be entitled to
more than bearers of only the German passport." There was no concrete discussion about
what these entitlements would be. Rather, the Union capitalized on the vagueness of its
claims.
This campaign was especially successful and influential in the 1999 February

Landtag (state) elections in Hesse where the Red-Green coalition lost what was thought
to be a secure state. The COU state chairman, Roland Koch, made dual citizenship the
central issue in his campaign, organizing a petition drive against dual-citizenship that
collected five million signatures nation-wide. This anti-dual citizenship movement was
central to mobilizing public opinion against both the proposal for the reform of the
citizenship law and the Hesse state led SPD/Green alliance, whose coalition was
proposing the law on the federal level. Ultimately, the Greens lost much support in Hesse
which contributed to a COU-Ied state parliament. The results had significant impact on
the federal level because with the CDU electoral win in Hesse, the CDU/CSU gained the
15 The

issue of dual nationality and the views of political parties will be further discussed in Chapter 2.

24

majority in the Bundesrat, Germany's upper house where the SPD-Ied coalition had
previously ruled. Thus, the Red-Green coalition in the Bundestag would not be able to
pass any law without the approval of the CDU/CSU in the Bundesrat. The desire for
legalizing dual-citizenship was then dropped, and the FDP brought forth the

Optionsmodell, or option model, which allows the decision to be taken between the ages
of 18 to 23 concerning which nationality to keep.

It should be noted that the liberalizations of the reform, namely the reduction from
fifteen to eight years ofresidence and the adoption of the jus soli principle, was
accompanied by the necessity to have satisfactory German language skills, I 6 a requisite
previously not needed.
Figure 1.4: Major changes to the citizenship law for foreigners

Necessary residency
period before applying
for citizenship
Dual citizenship

Before 1999 reform
15 years

After 1999 reform
8 years

No

Child is granted
citizenship from:

The parents - blood descent
(jus sanguinis) principle

No, but children born on
German soil offoreign
parents having legally lived
in Germany for 8 years
receive both German and
Parents' citizenship;
between the ages of 18-23,
the child will have to decide
which citizenship to retain
The parents - blood descent
(jus sanguinis) principle and
the state - birthright (jus
soli) principle - if parents
have legally resided in
Germany for 8 years

16 This is phrased as "ausreichende Kenntnisse der deutschen Sprache" and is found in paragraph 86 Nr. I.
It is up to the individual states to determine what ausreichende, or satisfactory, entails.

25

The other law signifying a paradigm shift within German politics was the
adoption of the 2004 Immigration Law. However, even more so than with the Reform to
the Citizenship Law of 1999, the adopted version of the Immigration Law was a far cry
from what was initially proposed by the Red-Green coalition. All major changes
proposed, namely adopting a point system to actively select desired economic migrants,
the lifting of the 1973 recruitment ban of foreign workers and the non preferential
treatment of German and European Union citizens, were all left out of the law. Even
though the Immigration Law brings few alterations to the previous policies, it is
nonetheless a change in that it is now recognized as a federal law. In this regard it can be
seen as contributing to the paradigm shift in the country to an 'immigration country.' As
recently as the Kohl chancellorship.V the Government had resisted the notion of the
Federal Republic as a country of immigration, maintaining that the 'boat is full.' Now
that Germany has recognized itself as a country of immigration, the challenge that
remains is to better integrate the foreigners into society. For the current left-of-center
Government, that means making the foreigners into full, voting members of the
country. 18

1.5 Citizenship and citizenship policy - Literature review
Citizenship and its importance have been increasingly debated since the end of the
1980s. T.R. Marshall is generally seen as the originator of the debate on citizenship,

attributing three elements to it, namely the civil, the political and the social. The civil
element comprises the individual freedoms, such as that of speech and of religion.
Kohl was Chancellor in the Federal Republic from 1982 to 1998.
goals of the Government for the Reform to the Citizenship Law of 1999 will be further discussed in
Chapter 2.
.
11 Helmut

18 The
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Political participation, in the form of voting, defines the political element. The social
element is explained by Marshall as "the rights to share to the full in the social heritage
and to live the life of a civilized being according to the standards prevailing in the society.
The institutions most closely connected with it are the educational system and the social
service" (Rees, 1996: 5). It is to be noted that Marshall concentrated on the three decades
following -wwn, focusing on Europe. The reality of the 21 st century, with globalization
and increased human mobility, has brought many more foreigners to the European
continent, but studies concerning citizenship remained on the fringes of academia; the
large part of migration was due to guest workers, and most people believed that they
would return to their countries. Furthermore, the economic strength of Europe throughout
most of the post war era also contributed to the initial lack of study of citizenship; the
foreigners were seen as contributing to the economy, and it mattered not if they were
citizens of another country. However, as the number of foreigners grew substantially
more rapidly than the non-foreign population in the developed world, and as foreigners
were seen less and less as assets to the economy, the subject of citizenship gained
attention with Marshall's as its basis.

In contemporary debate and for the purpose of our study, citizenship is
understood as formal nationality status, and involves Marshall's three elements. It is seen
not only as a symbol of national attachment or loyalty, but in addition as a means to
include, thus in addition exclude, members of society from civil, political or social
processes. Furthermore, citizenship entails equality before the law. Specifically related to
Germany, citizenship guarantees the right of residence in the country, allows for
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participation in the political arena and gives access to some public-service employment
reserved for citizens, such as civil servants within the governmental administration.
There are a number of scholars that believe that citizenship policies and practices
are converging within liberal-democratic states. Patrick Weil (2001) maintains that there
is convergence in citizenship policies of states, due to democratic values, established and
secure borders and a similar immigrant experience within the states themselves.
Cornelius and Tsuda (1998) also support a convergence hypothesis, but one which is
based more on institutional similarities, such as comparable political systems and the
influence of regional integration. They cite analogous domestic pressure and historical
legacies in liberal democratic states, as well as the desire to copy policies of countries
with positive immigrant experiences, such as Canada, as reasons for convergence.
Brubaker (1992), in his extensive study of French and German citizenries, advocated that
Europe's laws concerning i.mm.igrants and naturalization were converging, but that
fundamental differences, such as havingjus soli in France andjus sanguinis in Germany,
would remain due to the cultural understanding of nationhood.

Germany's historical and cultural understanding ofcitizenship
Germany's history, which was discussed earlier in this chapter, explains why
Germans have been so reluctant to let go of their cultural understanding of nationhood.
The states that formed Wilhelmine Germany in 1871 were bound by language and a sense
of common ethnicity more than by national identity. The self-identification of being a
German was thus founded on this language and ethnic heritage. For this reason, granting
admittance to foreigners into German territory, initially Poles .in the East for labor
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intensive agriculture, potentially brought economic benefits for the country and was not
perceived as problematic. Granting citizenship to foreigners, however, was an entirely
different question, and was never seen as a German economic or demographic interest.
Poles could not become German.
Brubaker maintains that the development of the state and its traditions have
greatly shaped citizenship policies:
German states - Prussia and other states before unification,
Imperial Germany, the Weimar Republic, the Third Reich, and
both German states after 1949 - have relied exclusively onjus
sanguinis ever since citizenship law was first codified in the early
nineteenth century...France and Germany continue to define their
citizenries in fundamentally different ways because they have been
doing so for more than a century. (Brubaker 1992: 186)
Most other nation-states in Europe were born out of the French revolution, where
access to citizenship was, in theory, open to all regardless ofrace or class; the primordial
element was loyalty to the nation. However, in Germany, citizenship was not open to all.
Nathans (2004) writes that,
[citizenship law] became a final barrier to the permanent settlement
of foreigners who had managed to reside for a long period within the
state. The Federal Republic therefore initially found little reason to change
those parts of the citizenship law that gave the state administration wide
discretionary powers over the granting of naturalization petitions. As
in the Weimar period, Land governments used their authority with respect
to the naturalization of foreigners to prevent individuals who were not
ethnic Germans from becoming citizens (Nathans, 2004: 237).
Germany's notion of identity explains why the desire to exclude foreigners exists :
By contrast [to English speakers], Germans, like many other Europeans,
more easily conceive of a nation (Nation) or people (Volk) as an aggregate
existing independent of state organization, unified by certain commonalities
such as language, religion, culture, history, and descent.
(Neumann, 1998: 249-250)
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Similarly, Brubaker (1992) thinks that the understanding of citizenship continues
to reflect deeply rooted understandings of nationhood, basing his study on France and
Germany. Thus, Germany's history of having a common language and culture still
greatly influences the Germans' perception of their identity. However, there are some that
believe this understanding is slowly changing. Klopp (2002), for example, maintains that
the ethno-cultural notion of what it means to be German is progressively changing, seen
with the adoption of the citizenship reform of 1999. Furthermore, the post-nationalists
believe that since national citizenship is becoming less important, the idea of the 'nation'
is fading and being replaced by loyalty to supranational institutions.

National or post-national citizenship?
There are two major schools ofthougbt concerning citizenship. The first thinks
that citizenship is still very much relevant and important to individuals in society. Joppke
(1998) believes that the nation-state is still a sovereign actor with regards to the control of
its borders and the pressure of international conventions, and that citizenship is important
because of this; citizenship is what allows you to enter your country, or perhaps have
freedom of mobility in other countries. Joppke uses the example oflanding in Sydney's
airport in Australia; without the proper documentation, namely a passport, it will be very
difficult to enter the country. Hansen and Weil (2002) suggest that nationality laws, not
international conventions or treaties, determine who has the right to receive a passport.
The passport, in tum, entitles the bearer to the privileges extended by the nation-state, the
most important being the right to vote and ..the right to be free - as only nationals are 
from expulsion and arbitrary changes to entitlements" (Hansen and Weil, 2002: 1). Thus,
those without the passport are excluded from these benefits. Torpey (2000) supports not
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only the claim that passports are important, but in addition that they are increasingly
becoming so, as the nation-state's ability to monitor its citizens and control its borders
has increased in the last decades, thanks largely to technological developments.

Other scholars believe that the benefits offered by citizenship are essential for
long-term foreign residents, as they will eventually resent their exclusion from the
political sphere. As Klopp (2002) writes, "as the myth of return to the home country
slowly fades for first-generation immigrants and is increasingly a nonissue among
subsequent generations, denizens come to regard second-class membership without
effective political representation as unacceptable" (Klopp, 2002: 19). This 'unacceptable'
view may translate into outward revolt against the state or may force the foreigners to
build up their own community within the state, which ultimately leads to further
exclusion and may end up in confrontation.
The other school of thought advocates a post-modem approach to nationality,
stipulating that globalization has rendered the national passport meaningless in a liberal
democratic state. Soysal (1994) maintains that rights are granted to individuals now based
on their personhood rather than on their nationality and that national membership is not
necessary for membership in a state. She maintains that it is international conventions and
codes that guarantee the rights of foreigners within a nation-state rather than the
foreigners' relation to the nation-state. Furthermore, she claims to have found a
converging international trend towards the rights and status of foreigners within nation
states. Jacobson (1996) echoes Soysal in that he maintains that in a world of increased
migration, rights are granted more on residency than on citizenship status. In Germany,
for example, citizenship is not necessary to obtain social benefits, such as health care or
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unemployment benefits. Hence, for him citizenship is on the decline. Hammar (1990)
calls these long-term resident foreigners 'denizens', stipulating that due to their length of
stay within a country, the state has granted them certain rights usually allocated to
citizens, such as residential, working, social and legal rights. The denizens are
nevertheless still left out of the political sphere.
Faulks (2000) brings the postnational thesis of citizenship a step further, declaring
that global threats, such as a decaying environment, renders rights, responsibilities and
political participation of all individuals important. Globalization has created a situation in
which our interests do not only lie within our national borders, and therefore citizenship
should then not be tied to a nation-state but rather to the global community. Castles and
Davidson (2000) also believe that globalization has posited a challenge to the traditional
understanding of citizenship, and that new forms of citizenship have started to develop.
One such Conn is multiculturalism. The other is the establishment of supra-national
political institutions in order for citizenship to still have importance, albeit on a different
level.
The notion of multiculturalism often suggests that national policies, such as high
social spending on minorities, have led to the inclusion of many different groups, be they
ethnically, religiously or racially based, into the legislative process. Thus, social benefits
have consequently been extended to members of these communities. Nevertheless, these
benefits may be superficial to some, as the key political and economic institutions may
still have the previous cultural biases.
The idea of a supra-national institution is most easily explained with the European
Union. When the interests of different nation-states are closely linked, national borders

32

lose meaning and loyalty is then transferred to a higher body. The idea of a 'European
citizenship' has yet to take hold but some argue that the increased integration and
movement of population will eventually lead to it.
In order to adequately conduct this study, it is vital to understand how Germany

views citizenship. The Government's belief concerning citizenship may differ greatly
from what the foreigners deem citizenship can offer. For example, the Government may
believe that a passport is important because it offers its bearer the security of residence,
whereas foreigners may believe it is important because it offers greater access to the job
market. If the efforts of the Government are focused on one issue that they believe is
important to the target population and if that target population's beliefs do not coincide
with the Government's beliefs, this discrepancy might lead to a gap between stated policy
goals and actual outcomes, and would be an example of the factor 'poor understanding of
target group's wishes'. Fundamentally, it is Germany's understanding of citizenship that
determines the framework in which citizenship law is reformed in that citizenship law
can only be reformed within Germany's understanding of it. If the framework is a post
national understanding of citizenship, it will unlikely be changed, even if foreigners may
view citizenship very differently.

Policymaking in Germany
Policymaking in Germany has been extensively studied in the last two decades.
The most influential work stems from Katzenstein (1987), in which he suggests that the
policymaking structure in Germany "makes large-scale departures from established
policies an improbable occurrence" (Katzenstein, 1987 : 35). In his explanation,
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Katzenstein coined the term 'semisovereignty' with respect to the limitations the
institutional infrastructure may place on Germany's Government. Due to coalition
governments, parapublic institutions and intergovernmental relations, the Government is
never fully free to act according to its own will; the aforementioned factors limit its
sovereignty.
Simon Bulmer (1989) concurs with Katzenstein"in that policymaking in Germany
is limited by certain factors, but points towards the institutions of the country as having
the greatest influence. Thus, whereas Katzenstein suggests that party ideology in the form
of coal ition governments and intergovernmental relations may be a more significant
factor in policy outcome, Bulmer believes that the influence of institutions such as the
Federal Bank (Bundesbank) provides stability to public policy. For Bulmer, institutions
such as the Federal Bank have great legitimacy among both the national and international
policymakers, and in order to maintain this trust, it does not pursue radical policies. For
this reason, Bulmer maintains, Germany is unable to pass legislature that produces more
than incremental results. Dyson (1982) also believes that there is stability in public policy,
but that this constancy is a product of Germany's history. Since the b.istoricallegacies,
namely the failure of the Weimar Republic and the brutality of the authoritarian regime of
the Nazi dictatorship, were not positive experiences for the country, policymakers strive
to distance themselves from the past. According to Dyson, this has made consensus
politics, absent in the earlier periods, a key factor in policymaking. Roberts (1989)
disagrees with Dyson, and maintains that consensus within German politics is a product
of political parties rather than the country 's past. The political parties should be credited
for having developed a party ideology incorporating consensus. Fundamentally, Roberts
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opposes the view that consensus is 'natural' in German politics, and argues rather that
stability is due to party ideology. Regardless of why consensus politics is present in the
Federal Republic, it seems to be a determining factor in policymaking. As Manfred
Schmidt (1996) writes:
the requirement of co-operative strategies inherent in Germany's
majoritarian-curn-consensus democracy model have been among the
major determinants of the debate on institutional reforms, and have
narrowly circumscribed the options available to practically minded
reformer. (Schmidt, 1996: 93).
The notion of having limited options for reform is important in the case of our
study. There is very little literature on the effects of variables, such as political
institutional structure or domestic pressure, limiting citizenship policy in Germany. Heike
Hagedorn's (2001) extensive comparison on naturalization in Germany and France is an
outstanding empirical analysis of citizenship in both countries, but only briefly alludes to
factors that may affect policymaking. Hagedorn concludes that the policyrnakers' public
dialogue still uses the notion of the German nation as an ethno-cultural entity, yet that the
reality of dual citizenship in Germany contradicts this discourse; She also maintains that
certain elements in the political arena have become more conservative since unification,
offering a cogent opposition to the Red-Green coalition in recent years.
Green (2001, 2004) has worked extensively and published widely on the issue of
citizenship in Germany. In a study on the Green Party's failure to pass laws containing
major elements of party ideology, he points to both Germany's federal structure and the
role of political parties as decisive factors. Green argues that cases in the past, such as the
1990 Law on Foreigners, "an election in one single stale can dramatically limit the scope
of a major government reform" (Green, 2001(c): 12). As for the other factor, he
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maintains that the key decisions are taken within the political parties themselves, as that
is where most of the debates are held. In suggesting that the parties are crucial to policy
outcomes, Green downplays the importance of certain institutions in the Federal Republic,
such as specific ministries, and opposes Bulmer's insistence on the importance of
institutions like the Federal Bank.

1.6 Research methods and hypothesis
Given strong evidence of consensus and incrementalism in the discussion of
Germany's policymaking, this study posits that the institutional structure of the Federal
Republic will contribute significantly to the goals-outcomes gap. When the Bundestag
and the Bundesrat are led by different parties, it limits the capability and probability of
the Federal Government to implement major policy change. Furthermore, the Greens, in
this case the junior coalition government, may have pushed for a version of the reform
that fundamentally met political and public resistance.
Other factors may also have affected the outcomes of the reform, but it is
anticipated that the country's institutions, especially given intervening events such as
state elections, will be the most important contributor to the gap between the goals and
results of the Government.

In order to test the hypothesis, the dependent variable, namely the gap between
the desired outcomes and the results of the citizenship will be shown and examined. The
independent variables, or in other words the possible contributors to the gap discussed in
section 1.4 and summarized in Figure 1.1, will be explained as they relate to the gap.
Official Government, political party and immigrant organization documents, official
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statistics, previous literature on the subject as well as newspaper articles will form the
basis on which the independent variables can be tested. It is the goal of this study to
determine which determinants have contributed the most to the gap in Germany's recent
citizenship law reform .
Furthermore, interviews conducted during the month of January 2005 supplement
the research for this study. Three target groups were identified for interviews. The first
were individuals associated with the political side of the reform. Thus, members of the
Bundestag from different political parties who have worked in the
immigration/citizenship areas were interviewed, as were aides working in governmental
offices. The members of Bundestag interviewed have all served on the Committee on
Internal Affairs, which is responsible for questions concerning citizenship. Also in the
political participant group are individuals associated with the Federal Commission for
Migration, Refugees and Integration, which is largely an executive branch of the
government.
The second group interviewed is formed by analysts of policies and represent the
academic side of the question. Immigration and citizenship has been a growing topic in
the academic world as the patterns and processes of the last 30 years have been tracked
and analyzed by academics themselves. These academics offer a well-informed opinion
with no political pressure, and are themselves often consulted by the government.
The last group is the target population, namely the foreigners. This group gives
the first hand account of the repercussions of the Reform to the Citizenship Law.
Individuals interviewed were all at one point bearers of a non-German passport, although
some have since naturalized. They are all individuals who still work with foreigners, thus
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are familiar with the reform and its effect on the foreign population of the Federal
Republic. For a complete list of individuals interviewed, see appendix.
As the title of this study suggests, it seeks to examine the gap between stated
governmental goals and actual policy outcomes, and in doing so identify the most
important determinants of the gap. It is therefore an assessment ofpo litica I promises. In
addition, this study adds to the virtually non-existent literature on the expectations of
foreigners living in Germany and their perceptions of whether or not their expectations
have been met with respect to the citizenship law reform. Most of the literature focuses
on the government side of the question, or merely on the quantitative data since the
adoption of the reform and does not explore the repercussions on or the satisfaction of the
foreign population.
This study also attempts to shed light on the general quantitative results of the
Reform to the Citizenship Law in Germany of 1999. Between the time of the 1998
federal elections and the adoption of the reform, debate concerning citizenship was
rampant within society. However, since the adoption of the law, society's attention has
been drawn elsewhere, mostly to the unemployment crisis in the Federal Republic, and
Agenda 2010, the Government's reform plan. Although only five years have passed, it
should be enough time to assess the impact on the foreign population in Germany, with
respect to the statistical data concerning naturalization.
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"We have always made it clear that we attach much importance to societal peace that the
integration ofthe foreigners who have lived here continuously offers. Integration means
approaching each other. The Federal Government does this with this reform. ,,/9
- Otto Schily, Interior Minister ofGermany January 13, 1999

Chapter 2 - The Goals of the Policymaker
This chapter, divided into four sections, examines the initial goals and outcomes
of the reform from the policymakers' point of view. The first elicits the objectives of the
different political parties for the reform. The second part examines the reality of
naturalization in Germany since the adoption of the reform. By comparing the initial
goals of the policymakers with statistical evidence of the actual results, it will be shown
that that to a large extent, the reform did not bring about the outcomes that the
Government expected and desired. Part three discusses the parties' assessment of the
results produced by the reform. Since the outcomes did not lead to as many
naturalizations as the Government had hoped, the fourth section attempts to analyze both
why the goals for the reform may not have been met, and why the Government has
maintained a rhetoric of success four years after the law's coming into effect.
2.1 The goals ofthe political players

The Government
As stated when the SPD first came to power in 1998, the integration of foreigners
is a very important topic for the party as well as being the major goal of the citizenship
reform. As a matter of fact, Schroder's addressed the issue of the citizenship law in his

Bundesministerium des Innern. Das Gesetz zur Reform des Staatsangehiirigkeitsrechts yom 15. Juli
/999.
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first policy speech as Chancellor, saying that "Our feeling of national identity is based not
on the traditions of ancestral rights but rather on our self-confidence as a democratic
state" (Die Welt, November 11,1998). This shows that as soon as the Red-Green
coalition came into power, already it wanted to abandon the old principle of granting
citizenship based on the parents' nationality in favor of birthright citizenship.
A few months before the September 1998 elections when potts were showing the
SPD being favored by 44 percent 0 f the population, Comelie Sonntag-Wolgast, the SPD
interior-policy specialist, stated that the principle of the right of birth as well as the
making naturalization easier for second generation foreigners would be "minimum goals"
that would "at least" have to be implemented during the term (Frankfurter Allgemeine

Zeitung, July 16, 1998). There was the belief within the party that the acquisition of a
German passport would lead to closer and stronger identification and attachment to
Germany, Furthermore, there was the desire by some within the party of ridding
Germany of its viilkisch identity, that is to say. of its identity based on ethnic lines,
incorporating language, culture and religion.
The SPD sees German citizenship as a kind of guarantor of rights. It offers the
security of legally residing in the country, removing any worry that a residence permit
will be revoked or not renewed. That in itself, according to Dr. Vera Weissflog, an SPD
legal expert, is enough incentive to apply for citizenship: "It may be a personal choice to
participate in the democratic process in Germany but we [the SPD] think that it is an
important thing to do. Without citizenship, uncertainty of being allowed to remain in the
country is always at the back of the mind" (Interview Weissflog, January 15,2005).
Other interviewees echoed Weissflog, saying that participation in the political process
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was a valuable and important thing to do because it demonstrated one's attachment to the
country. Mark Holzberger, a Green Party expert on citizenship, emphasized that voting
was the most vital act an individual could perform in a democracy because it is "possible
to see the direct results of one's actions" (Interview, Mark Holzberger, January 14,2005).
Since citizenship is required to vote, it is then, by extension, also vital.
Another stated goal of the coalition was reducing the number of residents in the
country not allowed to vote. There is the fear within all political parties that if the foreign
population keeps growing and represents a large proportion of society, and if they are left
out of the political process, it can lead to societal unrest." If the foreign population
becomes large and politicized, yet as non-voters do not have lobbying power in the
political arena., there is the fear that they will feel disfranchised. This feeling will work
against integration, as there may be contempt for the citizens of the country.
The citizenship reform for the Greens was important for Germany's republican
self-identity. "In the long run, no democratic society can afford an increasing gap

between the resident population and the voting population" (Bilanz gruner
Einwanderungs- und FlOchtlingspolitik, 2002: 3) This desire to make the

Wohnbevolkerung, or the population living in Germany, to a Wahlbevolkerung, or
population with voting rights in Germany, was repeated constantly in statements from

Green and SPD politicians the preceding and following months of the reform. This goal
was reiterated during interviews in January 2005. The argument holds that once one
belongs to the voting population, one feels more attached to country and will therefore
anempt to integrate.
20 For theoretical background, see Hammar (1994) . "Legal Time of Residence and the Status of
Immigrants" in: Bauboeck, R., (ed.), (1994), From Aliens to Citizens. Redefining the Status ofImmigrants
in Europe, European Centre Vienna, Austria, pp. 187-198.
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On the ideological side, the liberal democratic norms of Germany, in contrast to

the dated conservative citizenship law, as well as the harmonization of European Union
law were cited by as motivations for the adoption of the reform. The Federal Republic
could not hold declare itself a liberal democracy and carry on with practices that do not
encourage the integration of foreigners. ''This reform is aimed at closing the gap that has
existed to date between social reality and citizenship status. This gap exists because, in
practical terms, most of these people have become Germans. In legal terms however, they
continue to be foreigners" (German Embassy in London, 2005). The perception that
Germany had not integrated its foreigners well was prevalent, and liberal-democratic
Dorms hold that all individuals should have the same opportunities. Citizenship, thus,
should not create a barrier to have access to these opportunities, especially not for
individuals who had lived in Germany for an extended period of time.
On the European level, Article 17 of the 1992 Maastricht Treaty stipulated that

"Citizenship of the Union is hereby established. Every citizen holding the nationality of
the Member State shall be a citizen of the Union." However, national citizenship was not
relegated to the back burner of the stove, which was embodied in an amendment in the
Amsterdam Treaty of 1999 stipulating that "Citizenship of the Union shall complement
and not replace national citizenship." The reality was that integration of the European
Union member states was increasing, and even if the treaties did not express that
Germany needed to reform its citizenship law, being more closely integrated with the
other countries put pressure on the Federal Republic to be like its peers. This is evident in
Government publications with such phrases as: "Now, it will also be possible to acquire
German citizenship as the result of being born in Germany (jus soli) as is the case in most
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other European countries" (German Embassy in London, 2005) (italics added). The
Office of the Federal Commissioner for Foreigners' 2002 report resonates the European
integration influence. "If all member states wanted to set their own exceptions and limits
on the European level, the harmonization level would inevitably be low and it would be
fatal to the political integration" (Auslanderbeauftragte, 2002: 25).
There was, in addition, a tactical motivation for the adoption of the law according
to some interviewees, such as Dr. Tarik Taribba, the consultant for issues concerning
foreigners in the office of the Federal Commissioner for Migrants, Refugees and
Integration, 21 who mentioned that it was to the coalition's advantage to naturalize
foreigners,

as they tended to vote in favor of one of the coalition parties. As a matter of

fact, Andreas Wuest (2002) demonstrates that within the naturalized Turkish population,
11 percent intended to vote CDU/CSU, 62 percent SPD and 22 percent Green Party. In a
separate study conducted by the Essen Institute of Turkish Studies, it was estimated that
87 percent of the naturalized Turkish population in Germany would approve of an SPDGreen coalition (Die Tageszeitung, September 23, 1998).
When the Reform to the Citizenship law of 1999 was adopted, Marieluise Beck,
as Federal Commissioner for Migrants, was the most outspoken politician regarding the
positive effects it would bring. She stated that more than half of the foreigners in
Germany, between three and a half and four million, would now have the right and
opportunity to naturalize although not all would send in an application (Frankfurter

Allgemeine Zeitung, December 30, 1999). In another statement, she said that the
Government was hoping that there would be one million more Germans by the end of the

Beauftragte der Bundesregierung fiir Migration , Fliichtlinge und Integration which is headed by
Marieluise Beck, a Green member of Bundestag.

21
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year 2000. Seven hundred thousand of these would be children under the age of ten who
have a two year period during which their parents can apply for citizenship under the
same rules as a child born in Germany after the adoption of the law. One hundred
thousand of the new citizenships, according to Beck, would come from the children in
Germany to foreign parents, being granted dual citizenship through the principle ofjus
soli. Between 200000 and 300000 naturalizations would be granted to individuals

fulfilling the necessary requirements (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, October 26, 1999).
It is to be noted that it was the Green Party that demanded implementation of the

right to multiple citizenships, which was reluctantly accepted by the SPD during coalition
negotiations.v' However, once the reform was formulated and presented to the Bundestag.
both the Greens and the SPD had similar goals. The Green Party may see itself more as
the guarantor of rights for immigrants whereas the SPD desires to portray itself as a more
practical party. It accepted the Greens ' position on multiple citizenship because
fundamentally, the SPD did not believe the issue of dual citizenship would alienate its
voters, and a small concession by the SPD on the issue of citizenship, very high on the
Greens' priority list, could bring them leverage for future coalition negotiations.

CDU/CSU

The CDU/CSU supported the status quo of citizenship in Germany, As a matter of
fact, they had chosen successfully to largely avoid the subject during the previous sixteen
years of rule under Helmut KoW. Simply put, according to the CDU/CSU, 'the boat is

full,23 and Germany should not be making it easier for foreigners to naturalize. Indeed,

22 For
23

details on the negotiations between the SPD and Green Party, see p.95-97 Green (2004).
It should be noted that Schily, the SPD Interior Minister used a similar rhetoric in 2001
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naturalizations should be limited. Whereas the SPD and the Greens see citizenship as a
component to integration, the Union believes that a German passport should be the final
component of integration. The Union's argument is that Germany should not allow
foreigners to become Germans if they are not well integrated in society, which means that
they must have a strong command of the language, must work and contribute to the
welfare state . Only those that demonstrate they are capable of this should be granted a
German passport, as a kind of reward.
However, when the SPD made citizenship reform one of its campaign topics, the

CDU/CSU answered by also introducing it to its 1998 campaign platform. The Union
stated that if reelected, it would reduce the required residency time from fifteen to ten
years, adding that the foreigners would have the right to German citizenship when they
were "ready to integrate"(Migration News, 1998) In addition, the platform stated the
possibility of easing naturalization requirements, but contained no specifications

(Suddeutsche Zeitung, July 25, 1998). The Union rejected dual citizenship as well as the
adoption of the citizenship through right of birth principle. Other than reducing the time
to ten years, the Union was in practice proposing nothing new.
The Union does not see Germany as a country ofimrnigration for two reasons: the
first being that the Federal Republic has high population density and can therefore not
accept more immigrants. The argument has recently been expanded by Angela Merkel,
the CDU Chairwoman:
For the Union, essential among other things is security. After 9111 in New
York and bombing in Madrid on March 11,2004, but also after the
Watergate scandal of the Department of Foreign Affairs or the experience
with the hate preacher.r" it would be irresponsible 10 leave things
24 Merkel is referring here to Metin Kaplan, the so called 'Caliph of Cologne ', who was deported from
Germany in 2004 to his native Turkey, which he had fled twenty years prior. He had previously served four
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unchanged. (Merkel, 2004)
Whereas the left-of-center parties understood change as liberalizing old laws, Merkel and
the

enu desired to make things more difficult for foreigners to enter and reside in the

country.
The other reason for which regarding Germany as a country of immigration was
problematic for the

cnu/csu was that too many foreigners dilute the German

'dominant' culture ideutsche Leitkultur). During interviews with enu aides, the view
that foreign workers had always created problems was expressed. "As soon as the guest
workers arrived, they started to create problems. But not European guest workers"
(Interview, Anonymous, January 17, 2005). Former Chancellor Helmut Schmidt has
recently gone on record saying that recruiting guest workers was a mistake (National

Post, November 25, 2004). Foreigners of other EU member states, according to the
Union , do not create, nor have they created in the past, any problems in German society.
Their European culture allows them to easily integrate into society, and hence offers no
threat to German culture.

FDP
The major goal of the citizenship reform, according to the FDP, was integration of
foreigners. The German passport for them, Like for the coalition, is important for
integration because it gives its bearers more rights, namely the right to vote in national
elections, and the assurance that they will Dot be thrown out of the country. Furthermore,
integration for the FDP is more important than the actual issue of citizenship; for the FDP,
the German passport is not the most important means for integration. Language skills, for
years in a German jail, accused under Schily's new legislation to crack down on Islamic legislation of
enticing his followers in the mosque of murdering a rival for leadership.
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example, were cited during interviews as more vital. This position varies a little with the
SPD and Green, which view the passport as integral for integration. As a very small

Frakiion, in the Bundestag, the FDP favored the reform as the liberalization of the law
would help with integration but declared no major goals for it.

1.1 The realities since 1999

Figure 2.1: Naturalization rate of foreigners since 1994
Naturalization of foreigners • 1994-2003
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Source: Bundesamt fiir Migration und Fliichtlinge, Statistik des Bundesamtes:
Einbiirgerung in Deutschland, 2004, p.86-88.
Looking at the graph titled 'Naturalization of foreigners', it is clear that the
number of naturalizations increased after the adoption of the Reform to the Citizenship
Law of 1999. The biggest increase came in 2000, the year of the reform came into effect
with 186 688 naturalizations. The number of foreigners living in Germany in 2000 was a
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little under 7.2 million2s which. makes the rate of naturalization of foreigners
approximately 2.56 percent. The comparative rate in 2003 is 1.92 percent, when the
number of naturalizations has diminished to 140 731 and the foreign population in
Germany augmented to a little more than 7.3 million. Thus, the 2003 rate is lower than
the 1999 rate of 1.95 percent, which itself was an increase from the 1.46 percent rate of
1998. In total, since the adoption of the law, there had been approximately 660 000
naturalized foreigners by the end 0£2003.
An important fact to keep in mind is that there is no data available for the number

of naturalization demands, only for successful naturalizations. Thus, the number of
individuals applying could theoretically be much higher. However, the interviewees all
agreed that if the basic requirements concerning legal residence and employment in the
country are met, most demands would be accepted. "It is my understanding that most
foreigners who apply are granted citizenship. The problem we [the Government] have
seen is that not enough people wish to apply" (Interview, Holzberger, January 14,2005).
Holzberger, along with Dr. Tarik Tabbara, suggested that new language proficiency
requirement may have created differences between states (Interview, Tabbara, January 10,
2005). It was suggested numerous times that some states, such as Bavaria, were much
stricter with regards to language proficiency than others, such as Berlin.
Following the jus soli principle, 41 257 children received the German citizenship
upon their birth in the year 2000. This number does not figure into the naturalization rate.
They will have to decide between the ages of 18-23 which of their two passports to retain.
It should be Doted that there was a special clause in the law with respect to foreign
children in Gennany that were born before the adoption of the law but that were less than
2.S

See Appendix 1 for data on the number foreigners in Germany since 1980.
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ten years old. Following the same guidelines of the requirement to have at least one
. parent who had legally resided in Germany for at least eight years, these children could
file for naturalization if their request was received before December 31, 2000. This
process led to 20 181 naturalizations in 2000 and 23403 in 2001. Thus , if these
naturalizations are subtracted from the totals, the number of naturalizations of long time
adult resident foreigners is in reality lower than the 186 688 in 2000 and 178 098 in 200 1
respectively.
The increase in naturalization has been minimal since the adoption of the law.
Furthermore, it is difficult to prove that the increase in 2000 was necessarily due to the
adoption of the reform because the trend in the last decade has been a general increase. In
addition, since 2000, the rate of naturalization has been decreasing to the point where the
1999 rate, before the reform, is higher than the 2003. The high 1999 rate has been
attributed by some policymakers (Tabbara, Holzberger) and academics (Scheidler,
Obliger) to the fear of some foreigners of not being able to satisfy the new language
requirement that the reform introduced, or to the processing of a backlog of demands.
It is important to examine the breakdown of the nationality of the foreigners in

Germany. One-fourth of foreigners are ED nationals, whereas approximately 28 percent
have Turkish citizenship, which grants them many rights under the Association
Agreement with the European Union. Of the individuals granted German citizenship in
2003,40.0 percent were Turkish, and only less than 3 percent were nationals of an EU
member state. 26

It is to be noted that the EO had 15 member states in 20OJ-the data for the post-2004 expansion is not yet
available.
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The total number of foreigners that had already been in Germany eight years in
2000 when the reform was adopted is close to 4.1 million, or 56 percent. Seventy percent
of Turks and Greeks, 75 percent ofItalians, and 83 percent of Spanish in Germany
fulfilled the eight year resident requirement at the time the reform was adopted (Green,
2005: 6).
In 1999, Marieluise Beck had said that the Government hoped for one million
new Germans before the start of 200 I. As of the end of2003, there had not yet been one
million. It was expected that close to 100000 children born of foreign parents would be
granted German citizenship on the jus soli principle. A little over 41 000 children were'
granted citizenship. Of the anticipated up to 700 000 children under the age often with
the right to naturalization, less than 45 000 had acquired it at the end of 2001, when the
one year period for application was ended. The period was then extended, demonstrating
that the Government was hoping for greater numbers.

It is clear by looking at the first two sections of this chapter, that the goals of the
policymakers and the results of the reforms do not coincide, except on one level, namely
the general liberalization of the law, and the synchronization of national policies with
other European nations. With the adoption ofjus soli, Germany extended of national
membership to a segment of the population that was previously excluded, that is children
born on German soil. It also brought the Federal Republic in line with the rest of the
European nations. The adoption of the reform, according to Green, is that "Germany bas
moved from the most restrictive fringes [in the ED] on citizenship law to the broad
mainstream" (Green, 2000: 120).
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However, with regards to the more specific goals, including desired number of
naturalization, there is clearly a goals-outcomes gap. This is the dependent variable of
this study. The next sections will attempt to determine the biggest contributors to this gap.

2.3 Party assessment ofthe reform's outcomes
Writing in 1992 about the 1990 Law on Foreigners, Brubaker states:
While this reform marks a significant change in direction, it is
unlikely substantially to further the civic incorporation of immigrants.
In the first place, the government rejected proposals to allow
immigrants to naturalize, as in France, without giving up their original
citizenship .. .More important, the rules governing the ascription of
citizenship were not changed. The system of pure jus sanguinis remains
in place. This, even more than restrictive naturalization rules, remains
the chief obstacle to the civic incorporation of immigrants in Germany.
(Brubaker, 1992: 173)

In these comments from Brubaker, he isolates two factors that were hindering the
'civic incorporation' of foreigners. The more important element, according to him, was
Germany granting citizenship based only on the principle of blood descent. This has been
changed with the 1999 reform. The other factor, which has only partially been accepted

in the 1999 reform, was the ban on dual citizenship. According to Brubaker, the issue of
dual citizenship would be the key to increase naturalization rates, whereas abolishing
descent by blood would improve 'civic incorporation', as all individuals born in the
country would automatically be granted the same rights, thus erase any type of
demarcation that exists now.
Much like Brubaker evaluated the 1990 law, this section depicts the assessment of
the political parties four years after its implementation of the reform. However, whereas
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Brubaker can call the law a failure, the Government will be reluctant to admit that its
legislation failed.

SPD
Policy makers within the SPD admit that it has not necessarily gotten easier to
naturalize because of the new language requirements, but the SPD is satisfied with the
achievement of the paradigm shift. Individuals within the party repeatedly stated that the
question of dual citizenship was not as important to them as the question ofjus soli, as it
had originally been the Greens that had advocated dual citizenship. There is also the
belief that the law has been successful for the children born in Germany, but not as
successful for those individuals that have resided in the country for many years. However,
the reform was intended for both children born in the country and those already resident

in Germany; the law was not meant to cater more to one group over the other, according
to the party.

Sebastian Edathy, member of the Bundestag and party expert

00

the issue of

citizenship, was the only individual interviewed that publicly stated that the Government
had expected more people to naturalize and that it was disappointed with the results
(Interview, Edathy, Janary 20,2005). Other members of the party maintained that more
time must pass before a complete evaluation of the reform can be performed.
Furthermore, when asked if the Government had initially envisioned a specific number of
foreigners being naturalized, the interviewees simply stated that more than before was
their goal, even though the Federal Commissioner had officially stated what the
Government had hoped for.
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The biggest reason attributed to the low naturalization of foreigners was the
necessity to give up one's previous passport; there is still, according to the interviewees,
much anachment to the homeland.
As Edathy said, "For what was doable, the reform has been successful." He
furthered this remark with an explanation that the loss of the Bundesrat majority made the
full implementation of the original program impossible. The implication of not being
responsible for the low rate of naturalization is clear; the Government had expected a
greater number of naturalizations but the resulting low rate is out of the Government's
hands . The policy makers did what they thought would lead to the greatest number of
naturalizations within the framework in which they were working, and the low rate is
attributed more to forces outside of the Governments control, namely public opinion in
Hesse against dual citizenship that led to a CDU election victory, bringing them a
majority in the Bundesrat.

The Greens
The Greens believe that the law was seen positively both at the time of its
adoption and in the present. According to a party publication on immigration policy,
the Greens see the passport as a means of integration.
The success of the citizenship reform speaks for itself: in 2000
approximately 187000 naturalization demands were accepted - 30
percent more as before the reform, In addition, the introduction of
the right of birth changed the statistics. Of the 91 000 children born
in Germany of foreign parents in 2000, 40 000 of them received the
German nationality thanks to the reform, (Bilanz gruener
Einwanderungs- und Fluechtlingspolitik, 2002: 3)
However, although individuals within the Green Party uphold that the law had
some successful elements, but that it was Dot entirely what the Party desired. The Greens'
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loss in Hesse is cited as a major blow to both the Party and the citizenship reform.
Another suggested downfall of the reform was that it was mainly an elite-led process; not
many representatives of the foreign population were present to voice their opinions and
concerns. Dr. Tarik Tabbara maintains that the reform has been successful, for close to
one million foreigners have b~ granted German citizenship since its adoption."
However, according to Tabbara, changes could undoubtedly improve the reform. The
most important change would be making the reform clearer; according to him, there is
confusion with regards to who satisfies the eight year residency period, as well as unclear
language as to what will happen to the children born to non-German parents. If they do
not officially choose one of their two passports, will they automatically lose their German
citizenship, which seems to be what the law suggests, although the Basic Law forbids the
taking away of German citizenship.
The Greens also believe that the adoption of the jus soli principle was more
important than the dual citizenship issue, thus on that level, the reform has been
successful.
The overall outlook of the Greens is summarized well in the Federal
Commissioner's report: "Overall, the new Citizenship Law has proved itself valuable.
Several particular groups still cause problems and will be dealt with either in the practical
implementation or in the contributions to come from the right of citizenship" (Beauftragte
der Bundesregierung fuer Auslaenderfragen, 2000: 63).

CDU/CSU

27

The 2004 totals are not yet known .
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The CDU still maintains that naturalization in Germany is too easy of a process to
undertake. One CDU aide said that the SPD was allowing naturalization like it was a
present (Interview, Anonymous, J anuary 17, 2005). However, they believe that the reality
has changed since 9/11; the dream that the SPD had of naturalizing the foreign population

has been crushed, and any issues dealing with foreigners will also have security as a
theme. For this reason, the number of naturalizations has not been extremely high; the
Government, according to the CDU, realized after 9/11 that it did not desire to naturalize
all of its foreigners, and has therefore not pursued the project as adamantly as previously.

FDP
According to the FDP, there are fewer people today, as opposed to the time period
right after the adoption of the reform, who maintain that it has been successful. During
interviews with FDP members, the reasons cited for the low level of naturalization in
Germany were money and the desire not to give up their original nationality. Dr. Max
Stadler, an FOP member of the Bundestag and one of the party experts on citizenship and
immigration stated that "there is still much attachment to the ancestral land, even though
most of the second and third generations have never been to their country of nationality"
(Interview, Stadler, January 24,2005).
The law, for the FDP, has a definite outlook towards the future; for them, the
primary purpose of the law was to allow children born on German soil to become
German citizens. Thus, the adoption of the jus soli principle was more important than the
acceptance of the dual nationality, which is generally seen as a means by which to
encourage established foreigners to apply for citizenship.
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Stadler, declared that politicians often believe that the right to vote is more
important to people than what the people in reaJity believe. For the everyday life of a
foreigner, Stadler continued, the German passport does not necessarily add much other
than security.
The CDU anti-dual citizenship Hesse campaign was successful, according to
Stadler, because it played on irrational fear that with two passports, the other, namely the
foreigner, would have more than the German citizen. Furthermore, the fact that it was
happening in their own home country made the issue very tangible. However, the FDP
believes that the German public is ready for the paradigm shift in the country, and that
the actions of the CDU/CSU, referring to the anti-dual citizenship campaign in Hesse, are
but exceptions.
According to the party, the law could have been more generous in terms of
making the requirements for citizenship easier, such as an even shorter residence period

as the eight years seems to have been taken quite arbitrarily. However, it was nonetheless

a step forward in liberalizing Germany's law, and a step forward, according to the party,
is a positive step.
The FOP was the only party with the belief that the subject of citizenship would
return to .the political arena in the next few years, and that a further liberalization would
occur. A motive for this beliefwas that the German public is still greatly affected by the
fear of terrorism, which is linked, according to the FDP, with foreigners. A cited and
well-publicized example were individuals in the Hamburg AI Qaeda cell with ties to the
9111 attack, who were not German born. Thus, when the memory of terrorism diminished,
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the fear of foreigners would in turn decrease, paving the way for more liberalization of
the citizenship law.
As Stadler stated, it has not necessarily become easier 10 naturalize, and therefore
perhaps the goals of the Government have not been met.

2.4 An analysis ofthe rhetoric- explanations for the goals-outcomes gap
Marieluise Beck, the Federal Commissioner for Foreigners called for a decrease
of the original 500 Mark naturalization fee six months after the coming into effect of the
law because it seemed it had not created the desired results. In Berlin, for example, there
had been a six percent decrease of naturalizations since the previous year tSueddeutsche

Zeltung, July 24,2000). However, a year later, when the nwnbers were still very similar

in some areas of the country like Berlin yet had risen a little in others like Munich, Beck
had no reservations about heralding the law as a success (Federal Government
Commissioner for Foreigners and Integration, July 5, 2001). Beck's statements represent
well the Government's reaction to the results of the reform, namely that the Government
will hold its own legislation as successful.
Only one individual member of the ruling coalition interviewed admitted that the
reform had Dot met the Government's expectations. However, even he maintained that it
was the best possible outcome for the framework in which the Government was working.
This latter remark is representative of the Government. There is a definite emphasis on
the qualification in the Government's rhetoric, meaning that the reform may not have
produced all of the original desires, but it is still a positive step in citizenship policy.
There is the refusal to a large extent of admitting that the policy has been a failure with
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respect to the fulfillment of its goals. When one looks at the 1999 statements of
Marieluise Beck declaring that the government expected one million new Germans in the
next year, and then examines if this total will be reached after four years, the law seems
to not have produced the expected results. However, in the words of Edathy, echoing
many interviewees, ''maybe the law has not produced everything that the Government

desired, but it cannot be seen as a failure because it is nonetheless a liberalization of the
previous situation" (Interview, Edathy, Janary 20, 2005).
lithe law has had some shortcomings with regards to long-term resident
foreigners, it has been hailed as largely successful by the Government with regards to the
adoption ofjus soli. According to policymakers, "the automatic granting of German
nationality upon birth will help with their integration into German society" (Interview,
Tamm, January l O, 2005) . However, even though close to two-thirds of foreigners have
resided in the country for at least the required eight years, only about 40 percent of them
satisfy the residence status provision, namely baving the necessary legal documents for
those eight years," that needs to accompany it (Green, 2000).
There was much discussion regarding the success of the paradigm shift within the
country, even though the naturalization rate was still low. This low rate was blamed to a
large extent on the existing illegality of dual citizenship. The only other major factor that
was mentioned as having contributed to lower naturalization rates was society's fear and
dislike of foreigners (Fremdenfeindlichkeit), although the FDP did not think. that was at
all a factor, apparently placing more trust in the individual citizen's character. Thus,

are different classifications of residence allowances (Aufenthaltsstatus), and only two of them,
namely Aufenthaltserlaubnis and Aufenthaltsberechtigung (residence permits) are adequate to satisfy the
eight year residency permit. Aufenthaltsbefugnis and AufenthallSbewilligung (residence authorizations) are
DOl considered satisfactory when applying for citizenship.
28 There
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much like a refusal to admit the failure of the policy, there is the emphasis on placing
more importance on the positive aspects of the law, namely the adoption of the jus soli
principle, instead of looking at its shortcomings.
The 1999 reform that was passed was a watered-down version of the original draft.
Thus, for many in the Government, the reform that was adopted could not produce the
desired results, which would have included the right to multiple citizenships. The
question that needs to be addressed is why the version of the reform that was adopted
could not produce the desired results?

Explanations/Causes for the gap between goals and outcomes
Field research and analysis of official and party documents reveal that the following
factors played a critical role in diverting governmental policy from its original goals.
They are factors posited in Chapter 1 as possible contributors to this gap.
Structure of Political Institutions
As stated, low naturalization was largely blamed on the failure to pass the
measure allowing dual citizenship. Indeed, most of the individuals interviewed agreed
that legal dual citizenship would have increased the number of naturalizations. The extent
ofthis increase, however, is impossible to know. "We have no idea how many people
would apply for citizenship because we have no data on that, but in my mind, there would
be a significant increase in application demands" (Interview, Tabbara, January 10,2005).
The original draft of the reform included dual citizenship, as it was an issue pushed by
the Green Party during and after the 1998 federal election. Examining the independent
variables outlined in Chapter 1, the institutions of the Federal Republic seem to have
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played a big role in the dual citizenship clause not getting accepted. To begin, without the
majority in the Bundesrat, it is very difficult for a federal government to implement a
radical reform, such as the citizenship reform. Furthermore, with ongoing state elections,
like the one the Red~Green coalition lost in Hesse, reforms must have a broad consensus,
which usually only leads to an incremental change; reform is tempered by awareness of
upcoming elections. Although the alterations to the citizenship law were significant, they
nevertheless remain incremental with respect to what was originally proposed.
A second factor linked to Germany's institutions that had repercussions on the
citizenship reform is Germany's structure of coalition governments. The Greens, being
the junior coalition member, pushed strongly for dual citizenship and the SPD acquiesced
to their demands. Fundamentally, it was the dual citizenship issue that instigated public
outcry against the draft of the law in the form of the CDU Hesse campaign, which in tum
led to a compromise by the ruling coalition looking for a wide consensus. As Dyson
writes:
[Germany has] a style of negotiation and consensus building [that] is based
on a conception of the interdependence of state and society and of the
importance of consensus in policy. This style is rooted in the power-sharing
that is implicit in the co-operative norms of the 'social-state' ideology, of
German federal arrangement and of coalition politics. (Dyson 1982: 18)

Katzenstein (1987) echoes Dyson in his study ofpolicymaking and politics in Germany,
writing that "[g]overment by coalition defines the structure of West Germany's party
system. The prevalence of government by coalition encourages incremental policy
change"(Katzenstein, 1987: 40). Whether it is the junior or the senior member of the
coalition that desires more radical political change, the influence of the other member
will ultimately bring the law more into the mainstream. Webber (1995), in his study on
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German institutions in the post-unification era, summarizes these conclusions well: "If
one were to search for a single expression to characterise the politics of the Bonn
Republic, it would surely have to be cooperation" (Webber, 1995: 5).
Whereas these scholars have made the case for the institutional framework in
Germany characterizing the manner in which policy is made, this study suggests that this
same institutional framework explains incrementalism in the case of the citizenship
reform in Germany. Hence, it is a major contributor to the goals-outcomes gap.

Policy implementation
As the interviews showed, policymakers within the Government will not admit

that any of their policies were failures, preferring to concentrate on the positive aspects.
The Government is able to do so because there was much ambiguity concerning the
specific number of naturalizations they desired; it was cited once by the head of the
Commissioner for Foreigners that the Government was hoping for one million new
Germans within the first year, but other than that, no numerical goals were stated. With a
general goal of naturalizing more foreigners than previously, the law can always be
looked at successfully. Furthermore, the opposition CDU/CSU, who could benefit from
pinpointing Government failures, has no real incentive to do so in the case of the
citizenship reform because more individuals are getting naturalized now than before,
even though the rate is still very low, and the Union is against this trend.
Ambiguous goals could have allowed the Government to put the citizenship
reform on the back-burner of its agenda. As a matter of fact, not long after adopting the
reform, tbe Government set to work on its immigration law and discussion about
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citizenship was quickly dismissed. Its lack of political will, thus a failure in policy
implementation, may have contributed to the gap. If the goals had been stated more
clearly, the Government would have been under more political pressure to achieve them.
Another component of failed policy implementation comes in the Government's
development and drafting of the reform itself without seeking proper information about
the target group. Even though 56 percent of foreigners in 1997 had lived in the Federal
Republic for at least eight years, only 38 percent of this group held the appropriate
residence permits that qualified their children to be granted German citizenship
(Auslanderbeauftragte, 2002: 54). These facts should have been known to the
Government, especially the Federal Commissioner for Foreigners' Affairs. It could have
realized that the reform, in its requirement of specific residence permits, would not
produce the desired results.

Public pressure/domestic public pressure

When we examine the issue of dual citizenship, or lack thereof, which is cited as
having been the greatest contributor to low rates of naturalization, two factors for the
extension of the status quo corne to mind. The first is institutional and has been discussed
above. By examining why the Greens lost support in the Hesse Landtag elections, the
other factor contributing to the refusal to accept dual citizenship becomes clear. The
campaign was based primarily on an anti-dual citizenship platform. There was a strong
public outcry against allowing foreigners to have more than one passport. It should be
noted however that close to 40 percent of the individuals being naturalized have dual
citizenship, as there exist provisions for its allocation (Auslanderbeauftragte, 2002:
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Tabelle 2).29 As a matter of fact, the CDU/CSU asked for a parliamentary enquiry about
dual citizenship, whose governmental answer stated that 43.3 percent of naturalized
individuals bad acquired dual nationality in 2001. In contrast, the year before the
adoption of the reform saw 13.8 percent of naturalized individuals being granted dual
citizenship (Press Statement BMI, August 4,2002). The Union complained of this rise in
dual citizenship (Welt am Sonntag, August 4,2002) but was quickly answered by Schily,
the Interior Minister, who demonstrated that the rise was accounted for mainly by the
children being born on German soil with the right to dual citizenship until they reach the
age of 23 years. The general public is nevertheless not aware of this and the Government
does not seem to desire to enlighten its population, especially after what happened in
Hesse. Furthermore, recent opinion polls have shown that more than close to 65 percent
of the German population is against dual citizenship (Green, 2001(c): 11). Clearly, the
Government does not want to antagonize this section of the population by letting them
know that dual citizenship is tolerated to a large extent. The opposition in addition has
nothing to gain from this information getting out to the public, because a majority of
those in the past that have been granted dual citizenship are Spiitaussiedler, the ethnic
Germans, who vote primarily for the CDU/CSU. Thus, public pressure, in this case a kind
governmental pressure imposed on the domestic population shaped by a lack of accurate
information about the realities of dual citizenship, has had a big role to play in the
outcomes of the reform. The Government, on the one hand, sees no objections to dual
citizenship, yet on the other, seems reluctant to let the realities of dual citizenship be
known to the general public so quickly.

29

Refugees and Spaetaussiedler are the two major groups that account for legal dual citizenship.
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Brubaker attributes this reticence of accepting dual citizenship in the public as
well within the circle of policyrnakers on Germany's political culture:

Germany lacks a political culture supportive of naturalization. This is
clearly expressed in the administrative regulations governing naturalization.
which state unambiguously that "the Federal Republic is not a country
of immigration [and] does not strive to increase the number of its citizens
through naturalization." In countries of immigration like the United States
and Canada naturalization is expected of immigrants; the failure to naturalize is
anomalous. (Brubaker, 1992: 77)
Since the time of Brubaker's comments. Germany has experienced a paradigm
change. officially understanding itself now as a country of immigration. However, this
transition seems to have yet not fully taken effect. Germans still attach much importance
to language and ethnicity, and the notion that "in German self-understanding. ..one
cannot join the nation-state by voluntary adhesion (the North American model) or statesponsored assimilation (the French model)" (Brubaker. 1992: 77).
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"If liberty and equality, as is thought by some are chiefly to be found in democracy,

they

will be best attained when all persons alike share in the government to the utmost. "
- Aristotle, Politics

Chapter 3 - The foreigners speak out
When looking at the governmental goals for the 1999 Reform of increasing
naturalizations in Germany, the liberalization of the citizenship law focused on two
groups: the children of foreigners who were going to be born on German soil and the
foreigners who were- already in the Federal Republic. Even more targeted among the
latter group were the foreigners who had already legally been in the country for at least
eight years, and therefore fulfilled the residence requirement to apply for citizenship.
However, what were their expectations, how did the foreign population in Germany react
to the adoption of the reform, and more importantly, how do they view the situation today?
Such are the questions that are addressed in the following chapter. Interviews
were conducted with individuals who headed organizations for foreigners. These
organizations did both cultural and political work with members of the foreign population,
and all of the individuals interviewed had once also been among the foreign population in
Germany before they applied and were granted German citizenship. These interviews,
newspaper articles and official documents from organizations for foreigners in Germany
form the basis of this analysis of the foreigners' expectations of the 1999 Reform to the
Citizenship Law and their assessment of policy outcomes.

3.1 - Expectations for the reform ofcitizenship
In Gerhard Schroder's first policy speech after being elected Federal Chancellor

in 1998, he declared that legal foreign residents who have been in Germany for a long
time should no longer be called 'guests.' "This Federal Government will therefore
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develop a modem citizenship law [:. .] We will therefore allow double citizenship."
Furthermore, Schroder spoke not only for the Government, but continued by saying that
Germans would reach out to ''those who live. work and pay taxes here, so that they can
become part of our democracy" (Speech, Bertin, November 10, 1998). Such promises
were certain to evoke expectations among the foreign population of the country. who,
like Schroder referred to, have been perceived as guests by a large part of the German
population.
For many foreigners in the Federal Republic, German citizenship could remove
any and all worries that may be attached to being a foreign national. It guarantees the
right of residence whereas all other permits are temporary and subject to revocation, it
gives access to public sector employment and allows for easy and hassle free travel
within the European Union. Thus, it seems logical to think of German citizenship as
attractive to non-nationals. A 1999 study by the Nordrhein-Westfalisches Landeszentrum

ftlr Immigration indicates that 56 percent of the immigrants interviewed had interest in
German citizenship, and the number reached close to two thirds for Turkish citizens
living in Germany. Furthermore, a study conducted by the Essen Institute of Turkish
Studies demonstrated that 76 percent of Turkish citizens in Germany said they would
apply for German citizenship if they could retain their original passport., and that 52
percent would be willing to trade their Turkish passport for a German one (FAZ,
September 25, 1999). However, interest as has been demonstrated by the statistics since
the reform of the citizenship law, does not necessarily translate into more naturalizations.
It is to be noted that these studies were conducted before the adoption of the

reform of the citizenship law, and before the Hesse election which forced the Red-Green
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coalition to abandon its plans for dual citizenship. To put matters into perspective, in a
1998 study by the same Essen Institute of Turkish Studies, two-thirds of naturalized
Turks in Germany admitted that dual citizenship and naturalization had been important
factors in their decision for whom to vote in the federal elections (Tageszeitung,
September 23, 1998); with the pre-election promises from the SPD and Green Party
concerning dual citizenship, it seems a segment of this group was attracted by the
prospect of regaining their Turkish passport they had relinquished when they acquired
German citizenship. Clearly, when foreigners were asked about their interest in acquiring
a German passport, their notion, as had initially been stated by Schroder and his
Government, was that they would be able to retain their old citizenship. Individuals
interviewed who work with foreigners also expressed the view that the foreigners in
Germany were expecting a law that would allow them to retain their nationality. Mr.

Aktas, Director of the Kurdistan Kultur- und Hilfsverein, an aid and cultural organization
for Kurds in Berlin said that he ''thought we would be able to keep our passport"
(Interview January 18,2005). Employees at Bayouma Haus, an intercultural center
offering services to foreigners in the Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg area in Berlin, stipulated
that foreigners still felt attachment to their homeland, partly because they had never fully
been accepted in Germany. It is clear that no individual desires to be a citizen of a
country in which he does not feel comfortable or welcomed.
Other than the expectation of dual citizenship, the 1999 Reform to the Citizenship
Law was in addition supposed to allow for easier naturalizations. The processing time of
an application was to be shortened, and the civil servants processing the application were
told to be more receptive to applications (Interview, Antje Scheidler, Director of
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Hwnanity for Action Germany, January 17, 2005). On top of the Government's
proclamation of a paradigm shift within the country, namely of incorporating the former
'guests' into German society and adopting the birthright principle for citizenship, a
massive informational campaign to get the new information out to the foreign population
was undertaken. All individuals interviewed agreed that there was both enough general
advertisement, in the shape of billboards and newspaper ads, as well as specific
information sent to foreigner organizations, in the forms of brochures and phone contact,
to adequately spread and publicize changes in the naturalization requirements.
With regards to the expectation of a paradigm shift within the country, the
interviewees all agreed that Germans were not ready, in 2000, to accept an influx of
naturaIized citizens. Mr. Aktas, representing the Kurdish voice, spoke of a poisoning of
the atmosphere in society during the CDU/CSU anti-dual citizenship campaign in Hesse.
He continued by saying that the climate had improved but that the Government did not
take enough initiatives to make this paradigm shift apparent. He noted how President
Bush had acknowledged Islam's celebration of the Id-al-Adha (Festival of sacrifice)
whereas Schroder's administration had nothing to say about it. Such some actions,
according to Aktas, can produce a more accepting atmosphere for foreigners.
Natasha Garay, Director of Bayouma-Haus (Interview January 7,2005), spoke of
how the initial hope of the foreigners frequenting Bayouma-Haus was quickly lost when
the requirements for naturalization were made known . Many of the foreigners Garay
works with are poor and jobless, rendering them ineligible for application. She, along
with Vo Cam Trang, a social worker for Vietnamese women in an organization called
AWO/ Arbeiterwohlfahrt maintained that a German passport was still attractive, most
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importantly for easier access to the labor market (Interview January 8, 2005). Both
pointed out, however, for these immigrants that have already been in the country for
many years, there are no major incentives to apply for citizenship: foreigners receive the
same unemployment and social benefits. Moreover, a recent ruling set the precedence
that the renewal of a residence permit is quasi de facto guaranteed if the applicant's
dossier has not changed, i.e. commined a serious crime. 30 Thus, when residency is
guaranteed, and a job or social benefits are secure, applying for German citizenship is
seen as more of a hassle than a benefit. For these individuals, it appears the economic
rights are more important than social, such as access to public sector employment, and
political rights of citizenship, in contrast to what the Government seems to have believed.
There seems, then, to be differences in expectations between foreigners of
different nationalities. The largest group, the Turks, albeit expressing in studies a strong
desire to naturalize, also seem to have the closest attachment to their 'native' land,
according to Rita Speck, a social worker and advisor for foreigners at Bayouma-Haus
(Interview, January 7,2005). Aktas also expressed a similar view, stating that it may be
difficult for some foreigners, such as the Turks, to abandon their nationality as they most
probably have ties and financial assets in Turkey. Furthermore, the 'myth of return' is
much stronger within the Turkish population than other foreign populations, which,
according to Aktas, is normal because Turkey is relatively close to Germany. However,
for Kurds, who have no Kurdish nationality and are a minority that bas greatly suffered in
Turkey, Iran and Iraq, relinquishing one of these nationalities for German citizenship is
very attractive (Interview, Aktas, January 18,2005). The Vietnamese population,
)l) 2002 ruling by the Federal Administrative Court in the case of 'Mehmet' . For more information, see US
Department of State Country Reports OD Human Rights Practices, p. 6.

(bttpllwww.bullen.demon.co.uklcibef80.htrn)
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according to Trang, was also ready to let go of their passport in favor of a German one .
Thus, when the issue of dual citizenship was abandoned by the Red-Green coalition,
some groups still wished to naturalize. whereas the hopes of other groups, such as a large
part of the Turkish population, seemed to have vanished.

3.2 - The perceptions ofthe law today
The Interkultureller Rat, an non-governmental umbrella organization working
with different foreign organizations in Berlin to improve the dialogue between foreigners
and Germans, summarizes well the general feeling among the foreign population in
Germany: "by looking at the numbers at hand, the reform can only he spoken of
conditionally as a success" (Interlrultureller Rat, 2002). The organization would like to
see further liberalization in the citizenship law, namely the granting of German
nationality to children born in the country as long as one parent has legally been in the
country for at least five years, instead of eight, allowing all children born in Germany
between January 1990 and December 1999 the same option to naturalize as those now
born in Germany, and decreasing their natura1ization free to 100 DM from the current
500 DM (50£ from 250£); getting rid of the Optionsmodell, the clause in which children
born to foreign parents must decide between the ages of 18 and 23 which of their two
citizenships they will keep; allowing multiple citizenship; easing the language
requirements; allowing for naturalization after five years of legal residence; and creating
a naturalization-friendly atmosphere in society (Interkultureller Rat, 2002).
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The interviewees thought that although the Government had proclaimed the law
as successful, they believe the Government had desired and expected more
naturalizations. Garay stated that "Schily goes around with a big smile on his face",
portraying the law as a success, even though so few foreigners have naturalized
(Interview, Garay, January 7,2005). There is also a consensus among the interviewees
that the reform was a first step in the right direction, but that there is still much that can
be improved. as the Interkultureller Rat's position demonstrates. Aktas believes that
language courses should be mandatory, which is actually a policy that has been
implemented by Government since the recent adoption of the 2004 Immigration Law, and
that they should be free of charge to foreigners. There is a definite notion according to
both the policymakers and the foreigner organizations that language is

~

if not the, key to

integration.
The language proficiency requirement as well as the naturalization fee were cited
by Trang and Garay as factors contributing against the decision to apply for
naturalization since the 1999 citizenship reform. Furthermore, some pre-requisites for
granting citizenship were added that affect a large section of the immigrant population.
Recipients of welfare and unemployment benefits are no longer eligible for naturalization.
The Federal Chairman of the Turkish Community, Hakki Keskin, stated in 1999 that due
to the 23.2 percent unemployment rate within the foreign population, such requirements
were sure to hinder the number of naturalizations (Frankfurter Rundschau, February 3,
1999). However, the objections by such associations as the Turkish Community appear to
have been largely ignored. Similarly, many organizations spoke out against the anti-dual
citizenship campaign and petition in Hesse to no avail. The Federal Foreigners Advisory
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Board (Bundesauslanderbeirat), a national grouping of the state level foreigners advisory
boards, which are themselves associations comprised of individuals elected by foreigners
and working with the Government in the interest of non-nationals, referred to the
campaign as "malicious defamation oflaw-abiding foreign citizens in Germany" and
declared that the CDU-led campaign had much greater negative effects on society than
any foreigner in Germany (Frankfurter Rundschau, February 22. 1999) . Welfare groups.
labor unions and immigrant groups across the country condemned the petition. Scheidler,
Director of Humanity in Action Germany, an association conducting research and
education on human rights, believes that the fragmented approach of these organizations,
as well as a lack of unity among the academics, who have in the past engaged. themselves
in societal debates, of the country rendered these efforts fruitless (Interview, Scheidler,
January 17, 2005).
The topic of the acceptance of the paradigm shift, from a country not tolerating
immigrants to a country of immigration, within German society was brought up in every
interview. Aktas believes that the Germans are not ready to fully accept foreigners into
their society, and spoke of parallel societies within the country, one being ethnically
German and the other grouping all non-Germans. Rita Speck, social worker and advisor
for foreigners at Bayouma-Haus, also suggested that even though there are clearly
foreigners in Germany, the question of whether or not they are integrated into German
society does not matter to the ordinary German. She suggested that the lack of discussion
concerning the citizenship reform right after its adoption is representative of this trait
(Interview, Speck, January 7, 2005). Garay pointed to the anti-dual citizenship campaign
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in Hesse to demonstrate that the foreigners still feel like foreigners in the Federal

Republic (Interview, Garay, January 7' 2005).
All interviewees agreed that the adoption of the jus soli principle was positive and
bad proved to be effective. In that sense, the law was seen more as directed to the
children born in Germany in contrast to those already here. As Speck mentions, "it is a
law with a vision for the future" (Interview, Speck, January 7, 2005).
With the adoption of the 2004 Immigration Law, the Government had an eye to
the future and altered further the process of acquiring citizenship that had been reformed

in 1999. As previously mentioned, there is now a language proficiency requirement that
is stricter than previous policy. However, as Cornelia Schmalz-Jacobson, former Federal
Commissioner for Migrants, stated (Interview January 23, 2005). it could be troublesome
to set a high requirement for language when 80 percent of second grade children in
Germany in some inner-city schools show difficulty in understanding German that is
deemed to be at their level. Thus, expectations for foreigners should not be too high, if
the standard of German schools cannot be met by the Gennan population itself. However,
due to this requirement, it bas arguably become more difficult to qualify for
naturalization. The other change is a simplification of residence permits, Whereas in the
past there were many different types, there exists now only two, namely a temporary and
an unJimited permit. This should make it easier for foreigners to satisfy the residency
requirement, as previously, only particular residency permits" could be counted as part
of the eight year residency requirement.

3.3 Analyzing the foreigners' perceptions: the contributors to the gap
31

See page 57.
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Identifying possible contributors to the gap between stated goals of the 1999
citizenship reform and actual outcomes are not only present in the analysis of the
policymakers' point of view, but also exist while examining the foreigners' responses.
This section identifies the possible contributors revealed by the foreigners' discourse, and
analyses which of them may have been the greatest determinant of the goals-outcomes
gap.
Public oressure/domestic public pressure
The paradigm shift seems not to have yet anchored itself in society. The foreign
population's dissatisfaction with the results of the reform demonstrates this very well; if
there was general satisfaction with the shift, such an organization as the Interkultureller
Rat would not have as many suggestions for the improvement of the reform. Thus, at
least part of German society's understanding of itself, at least at the time of the 1999
Hesse election, may still be based on ethno-culturaI lines, thus rejecting the statement that

Germany is a country of immigration.
Unintended consequences/poor understanding of target group wishes
The abandonment of one's previous nationality was quoted as being important in
not applying for citizenship by certain interviewees. As mentioned, many Turks are
unwilling -to give up their Turkish citizenship for a German one, and those that do apply
for German citizenship do it for practical reasons, i.e. better access to the labor market. It
had been the Government's goal of making the resident population into a voting
population. However, it seems that a large component of the foreign population in
Germany was less interested in acquiring political rights in Germany,
Client groups
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With respect to client group pressure, one of the possible contributing factors to
the gap, the experience of the fragmented opposition to the Hesse campaign is indicative
of its weakness in contrast to domestic public pressure. The client groups may lobby for
change, but the influence they have is small in contrast to a large segment of the
population. Furthermore, the reform was drafted by the Interior Ministry with little
consultation from outside sources, such as interest groups and NGOs. The original draft
was straightforward in that it suggested adopting principles that were common to many
other liberal democracies, such as the birthright principle and the allocation of dual
citizenship. Consultation, thus, seemed wmecessary. Consequently, client groups seemed
to have little or no influence before the initial proposal of the draft, exemplified by the
pleas by Federal Chairman of the Turkish Community. In examining why the Green
Party's lack of success in implementing legislation in their key party issues, Green writes:
there simply are no dedicated (insider' interest groups for the interest of
immigrant: churches and unions are principally restricted to providing
counseling and welfare services. The key parapublic institution in this
sector, the office of the Federal Commissioner for Foreigners' Affairs,
is only advisory, has no formal access to the cabinet and is
administratively located in the Labour Ministry, which lost the lead in
immigration policy to the Interior Ministry once labour migration had
ended in 1973. (Green, 2001(c): 7)
Workers' unions and church groups have traditionally been the most influential client
groups in Germany, although the lobbying muscle of both have decreased in the last
decade. Unions see the extension of national membership as a threat to the jobs of their
members, whereas many church groups are conservative and are nationally based, thus do
not seek to allow more foreigners into the country.32

32 Asylum seekers, for the church organizations, would be an entirely different issue, as a sense of Christian
duty to help the weaker party may come into play . The organization Proasyl is a good example of this.
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Another rationale for explaining client groups' weak position is proposed by
Veysel Ozcan, expert on immigration issues and aid to former Green Bundestag member
and present Green Party member of the European Parliament, Cern Ozdemir. Ozcan
believes that there was a lack of organization among the foreigners' groups, as well as a
lackluster response to the anti-dual citizenship campaign by the academics, which
according to

Ozcan could have mobilized students as well (Interview, January 21,2005).

The academics are not a client group per se, but have in the past participated in, as well as
influenced, societal debate. Such an example was the Historikerstreit of the 19805. Thus,
the weak lobbying power of foreigners' groups may be attributed to a lack of centralized
organization as well as a lack in numbers. This can be contrasted to the CDU campaign in
Hesse, which although not a client group, was successful precisely because of the solid
organization and mobilization a large segment of the population.
Policy implementation
As has been mentioned earlier in this chapter, there appears to have been enough
publicity of the citizenship reform, and rather than pointing to flaws in implementation,
the foreigners' discourse seems to direct the blame of the failure on the policy itself. Thus,
implementation does not seem to have had a major influence on the citizenship policy
failure.
The Government should have been more aware of the wishes of the foreign
population and known that retaining citizenship was very important to many of them
while economic anxiety outweigh any other type of concern. Studies demonstrating these
opinions existed. This poor understanding of the target group is not as important of a
determinant as public pressure because it is public pressure that ultimately affects
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political culture and the understanding of foreigners. The Government seems to have
started with the notion that foreigners would desire the passport because of the guarantee
it offered with respect to legal residency and because they would be able to participate in
the political arena of the country. Thus, to be a citizen was to live in Germany, to vote, as
well as to speak German, which is a precondition of being granted citizenship. This
would have conceivably been acceptable by a large part of the foreign population.
However, German citizenship also entails having only one passport, at least according to
the official policy. This national understanding of citizenship seems to not have been
desired by many of the foreigners in the country.
In the national understanding of citizenship lies the irony of the citizenship reform,
for although the reform seems to have liberalized Germany's conservative principles of
citizenship based on blood descent and an ethno-cultural and linguistic self-understanding
of the nation, the principles have nevertheless been reformed within the -national German
framework. The ethno-cultural bias of belonging to one, unique group, and owing loyalty
to only one entity is still present. It may appear surprising to some that the German
population, who in 2004 spent the most amountof money per capita on traveling, is still
reluctant to share the ownership of the country.
However, it is to be noted that the Government had initially proposed legislation
including dual citizenship, thus citizenship not based it Germany's traditional
understanding of its identity as an ethno-cultural entity. In that sense, it seems the
Government understood very well the desires of the foreign population. However, when

it was no longer possible to adopt the law as was originally desired due to the loss of the
Bundesrat majority, the Government claimed to still have a citizenship reform satisfying
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the desires of the population. It in addition claimed that the reform had been largely
successful, albeit the stated goals had not been met. The wishes of the foreign population
may have coincided with the original draft of the citizenship reform, but it does not
necessarily entail that the Government understood these wishes. It appears more likely
that the wishes coincided with the proposed draft, for the Government should have been
aware that the adopted version of the reform was not going to produce the desired results.
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"I do not love the state, I love my wife. "
- 1969 declaration of Gustav Heinemann, President of Germany
"I love our country. "
- 2004 Inauguration speech of Horst Kohler, President of Germany

Chapter 4 - Conclusion: evaluating the hypothesis
This study posited that the gap between the governmental goals and actual
outcomes of the Reform to the Citizenship Law of 1999 was produced by a variety of
factors, the most influential one being the institutions of the Federal Republic. Other
suggested variables were domestic public pressure and a failure in policy implementation.
The earlier chapters of this study concluded that these three factors did in fact contribute
to the goals-outcomes gap of the citizenship reform.
This chapter will elaborate on these conclusions, as well as examine and analyze
the other factors that were presented as possible determinants to the goals-outcomes gap.
This last section of the study will also suggest what could be further examined in order to
better comprehend the complexity of citizenship in Germany.

4.1 Client groups
Chapter 3 concluded that foreigners' client groups had no major impact on the
goals-outcomes gap because virtually no such groups were consulted in the drafting of
the reform. There was also limited impact due to the weak lobbying power of foreigners'
client groups, exemplified by the pleas for greater liberalization by the Turkish
Community and the Interkultureller Rat, two major foreigners' organizations, that were
ignored . This lack of political strength was partly due to poor organization, as there was
no united voice coming from the foreigners' associations, and to the absence of a large
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mobilization. Furthermore, the client groups with major lobbying power, such as
professional associations, trade unions and religious groups, do not hold citizenship as an
important question. In contrast to client groups, it was a large and mobilized regional
section of the German population that lobbied the Government to oppose dual citizenship.

4.2 Poor understanding oftarget group's wishes
An additional contributor posited as a potential contributor to the goals-outcomes
gap is the policymakers' understanding of the foreigners' wishes. When lacking, this
understanding may contribute to the development of a law that will not satisfy the target
group's wishes, leading to the law's poor performance. There has already been some
discussion about foreigners holding a different notion of citizenship in Germany than the
Government offered. Hence, many eligible foreigners have not applied for naturalization.
For many foreigners, the German passport is not important; naturalization would not add
to their quality of life as they already have access to all social welfare benefits under the
Association Agreement with the European Union. Furthermore, as stated, having to give
up one's previous nationality is unattractive to many foreigners. The Government thought
that many more foreigners wanted the benefits conferred by citizenship, namely the right
to vote, and that they would naturalize if the requisites were eased. There was clearly an
overestimation from policymakers of the attractiveness to participate in the political arena
and to have the legal security of not being deported.
Simon Green, a professor at the Institute for German Studies at the University of
Birmingham and a widely published author on immigration and citizenship issues,
especially related to Germany and the European Union, echoes this notion of poor
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understanding of the foreign population's wishes. He speculates that the biggest
contributors negatively affecting the foreigners' desire to naturalize are the fees and the
process of the application (Interview, Green, February 26,2005). This argument has two
implications. The first is that the desire to obtain German citizenship is present within the
foreign populace. However, and this is the second implication, the perceived benefits of
acquiring German citizenship do not outweigh the perceived costs of application.
Green's ideas fall in line with the conclusion of this study. Neither Green nor this
study make the claim that the desire to acquire citizenship is not present. Rather, both
conclude that citizenship extended to foreigners, mostly because it does not allow for two
passports, is undesirable to them. Where Green distances himself is in saying that the
costs and the process of application outweigh the perceived benefits, whereas this-study
simply claims that the benefits of German citizenship are perceived as minimal. Thus,
this study claims that a poor understanding of the target group wishes are a reason for
which the foreigners perceive the reform as inadequate and the benefits of naturalization
as minimal. Green, on the other hand, claims that bureaucratic sources, more in line with
failure in policy implementation, result in the German citizenship not being attractive to
the foreign population. Thus, Green supports the notion that the foreigners actually. desire
citizenship offered by the 1999 reform but are discouraged to apply by the application
process, whereas this study stipulates that the adopted reform simply falls short of what
foreigners wish for.

4.3 The Federal Republic's Political Institutional Structure
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It was suggested that Germany's political institutions may contribute to the goals

outcomes gap, in that the institutional arrangement limit the Government's ability to pass
major reforms. The political institutional structure contributed in that the CDU/CSU-led
opposition contested the reform of citizenship proposed by the ruling coalition. Their
resistance would not have been successful were it not for Germany's model of federalism;
after losing the majority in the Bundesrat, Germany's upper house, the Federal
Government was required to acquiesce to some opposition demands in order to pass the
reform. The final version of the 1999 law was, then, a broad consensus among the
political parties. Hence, it fell well short of what had originally been proposed, even
though it was heralded as a step forward : These incremental changes, instead of having
sweeping reforms, have been described in literature as characteristic of German politics
(Katzenstein, 1987; Schmidt, 1995).
The coalition governmental system of the Federal Republic was also determined
to be an institutional factor contributing to the goals-outcomes gap. The Greens, the
junior coalition member, insisted on incorporating dual citizenship into the reform.
Adopting dual citizenship in a country that had not significantly changed its citizenship
law since 1913 and that only produces incremental change in the face of a proposal for a
major reform was perceived as radical and was not received very well by the public.
Furthermore, the opposition to drastic change was utilized by the opposition for their own
agenda, namely winning the Hesse election. Thus, in light of what seems likelimitations
imposed on policy by the German governmental structure, in the form of the different
composition of the upper and lower house as well as the existence of.a coalition
government, it should come as no surprise that not all of the major changes the 1999
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reform originally proposed were adopted. Nevertheless, the coalition structure of German
politics appears to have played a lesser role in the goals-outcomes gap than the federal
system, in that even if the SPD had not reticently accepted the Greens' insistence on dual
citizenship, they still would have been faced with the possibility of a loss of the
Bundesrat majority; had it not occurred in the Hesse election, the Red-Green coalition
could have lost their majority in one of the many state elections that take place
throughout a federal government's term in office. Furthermore, there is no evidence
demonstrating the relationship between the Greens pushing for dual citizenship and the
Red-Green coalition's loss in the Hesse state election. Without a doubt, dual citizenship
was the CDU's main campaign issue, but whether or not the Greens' loss of votes was
directly related to their insistence on dual citizenship remains questionable. For instance,
exit polls found that 36 percent of voters declared dual citizenship as the decisive issue in
their choice whereas 43 percent named unemployment as a bigger worry (Migration
International Australia, 200 I).
Another contributing factor that was not posited in this study's hypothesis, yet
that fits within the institutional framework of the country and relates to the coalition
government, is the composition oftbe Federal Government. The cabinet, composed of the
Federal Ministers, is named and headed by the Chancellor. There are independent federal
commissioners who are named to lead a variety of offices, from the Federal Data
Protection Commissioner to the Federal Commissioner for Foreign Investment. The role
of the offices of the federal commissioners is to act as a link between the government and
civil society, investigate any complaint brought to them, as well as support whichever
group the office represents. The representative of foreigners' interests is the Office of
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Federal Commissioner for Foreigners' Affairs. It was the most outspoken governmental
organ about the reform, mostly concerning its goals. The office is headed by Marieluise
Beck, a Green Party member of the Bundestag. However, as stated earlier, since Beck is
only a Federal Commissioner, she is not a member of the cabinet, thus has minimal
influence in the Government. Furthermore, the office seems to hold only modest
authority in immigrant affairs in comparison to the Interior Ministry, headed by SPD
member Schily. Neither before nor after the reform's adoption did Schily echo Beck's
goals for it. Furthermore, Schily was the main player in the negotiations with the
opposition following the CDU's win in Hesse, thus able to better represent the SPD's
stance rather than the Greens' position. Since Schily had not publicly stated specific goals
for the reform, there was less pressure on the SPD to demonstrate that the new citizenship
law had produced quantifiable results. On the other hand, Beck and the Green Party seem
to have lost support within the German public because the goals that Beck had announced
had not been met. In addition, the Green Party was perceived as the weaker coalition
partner because it, not the SPD, lost the decisive amount of support in Hesse that cost the
coalition the election; the SPD received enough support to have two more seats in the
state parliament, whereas the Green Party garnered support for five seats less than in the
previous legislative period. It was natural for the Green Party to be more vocal about its
goals, as immigrant issues are more of a cornerstone policy for it than for any other
political party. Ironically, because of their political will to implement policy, the Green
Party may have lost support within the population.

4.4 Policy implementation
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It was suggested that flaws in policy implementation may have contributed to the
goals-outcomes gap in the form of either a lack ofwiIlingness among policyrnakers or of
developing the reform without adequate background research. In comparison to the Green
Party's directness about its desires for the reform, it has been mentioned that the SPD was
very vague with regards to stated goals. Essentially, this lack of specificity allowed the
SPD to evade criticism and to industriously work towards a greater naturalization rate.
This represents a lack of political will on the SPD's part, and is thus a policy
implementation failure. Another disappointment of policy implementation, presented in
Chapter 2, came in the form of the policymakers not recognizing that a large segment of
the foreign population already living in Germany for at least eight years did not have the
necessary residence permit to apply for naturalization. This should have been investigated
and known prior to the adoption of the reform, as this information would have given
policymakers the correct facts about the amount of foreigners actually qualified to apply
for naturalization. The Government has since simplified the system of residence permits
with the adoption of the 2004 Immigration Law, hoping to eliminate the complicated
categories of residency authorization. This alteration should qualify more individuals to
apply for citizenship. Time will tell if these individuals apply for naturalization.

4.5 Domestic public pressure
A possible reason for which the SPD was vague about its wishes for the reform is
domestic pressure, another factor posited as a possible determinant oftbe goals-outcomes
gap. It was posited that public pressure within the country may influence the
Government's actions in its desire not to foment popular discontent. The Government, in
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this case at the start of its term in office, may have worried about losing support for
upcoming reforms. Hence, it may have been its intentions to remain vague in order not to
create expectations that would need to be fulfilled. Since citizenship and immigration
issues are not the central issue within the SPD, it was possible for the party to maintain
imprecision with regards to the reform's goals. With a greater drive from the party for
such an issue, the SPD may have alienated the more conservative segment of its
electorate. The Greens, on the other band, were not about to lose support for immigration
issues, one of the pillars of party policy. On the contrary, if the party did not clearly state

its goals, its popular support, rooted itself in support of liberal policy for foreigners, may
have waned in favor of an even more left-of-center party, namely the PDS.
Domestic pressure appears in two forms. The first comes directly from the
population, thus is imposed from outside the policymaking process . This domestic
pressure can generally clearly be isolated, as it is present in the public sphere, and
ultimately, it influences governmental action. The anti-dual citizenship campaign in
Hesse is an example of domestic pressure imposed by the population that changed the
Government's intentions because it altered the composition of the Bundesrat." Not only
did it limit the governmental action, but it may have influenced the Federal Government
to alter its policies in anticipation of other state elections. By losing support in one state
with a certain policy, it would be logical not to pursue the same policy elsewhere.
The other kind of domestic pressure comes from the Government itself, and is can
be very subtle. It is 'domestic' in that the Government imposes it on itselfin order to
influence its population. This governmental domestic pressure is present in that dual

n It should be noted here that the motivation for opposition to dual citizenship within the population is not
known. Further study on the matter should be undertaken.
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citizenship is officially banned and spoken against by the policymakers but is tolerated in
a large percentage of naturalizations. It appears that the Government has avoided letting
the population, whose majority opposes dual citizenship, know about the reality of
naturalized individuals with two passports. The Government does not wish to antagonize
this large segment of the population and consequently lose support; the lessons from
Hesse have not been forgotten . Thus, it would seem that the domestic pressure from the
population influences the governmental domestic pressure, in that the public outcry
against dual citizenship has made the Government weary of addressing the issue.
However, this study suggests the opposite, namely that the governmental domestic
pressure, in the case of the citizenship, has created the circumstances in which domestic
pressure from the population can be expressed.
Referring back to the first chapter of this study, this argument becomes clearer. It
was suggested that in order to fully understand the goals-outcomes gap of the citizenship
reform, it was necessary to understand tbe notion of citizenship that Germany holds .
Does the Federal Republic believe that the national passport is still important in the
global world, offering rights and privileges that are desired by its bearer? Or does
Germany, with its experience of substantial immigration in the post World War II era and
its history of not granting them citizenship, believe that itscitizenship policy is still
desirable? In other words, does Germany believe that foreigners are capable of living in
the country, being granted economic and social rights, albeit excluded from the political
arena?
What existed for the foreigners prior to the reform was a kind of postnational
- citizenship, with which they were granted most rights normally granted to a citizen minus
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the right to vote and the guarantee of not being deported. However, with the advent of a
new left-of-center government came a paradigm shift in immigration and citizenship
policy. It was argued in Chapter 3 that this recent official paradigm shift to a country of
immigration bas not yet been accepted by a large part of society, let alone all political
parties. Furthermore, this paradigm shift was a move away from a previous policy in that
citizenship was extended to a wider array of individuals, namely foreigners who met the
necessary requirements. That is, at least, how the Federal Republic perceived the reform.
PoLicyrnakers believed that they were reinventing national citizenship in Germany and
distancing citizenship policies from the past in which ethno-culturalLines were of utmost
importance. Joppke agrees that "immigration does not render obsolete national
citizenship, as postnational membership analysts would have it." Furthermore, Joppke
continues, "contrary to Brubaker's diagnosis oflong-entrenched models of nationhood
determining citizenship laws and policies, immigration may trigger a redefinition of
citizenship, in departure from traditional models of nationhood." (Joppke, 1999: 187)
Germany attempted to 'redefine' citizenship, and move away from the formerly accepted
notion of the nation.
However, if it is phrased differently, the reform has a very dissimilar notion;
instead of saying that citizenship was extended to a wider array of individuals, the reform
can be understood as offering national membership to a community in Germany that has

in the past lived with a postnational membership. This postnational membership grants
them most non-political rights and has become part of the foreigners' identity in
Germany; it had become normal for foreigners not to have German citizenship and to be
excluded from the political arena of the country while having full access to welfare
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benefits. Thus, by offering what the policymakers perceived as a liberalized national
membership, namely citizenship that went beyond the previous understanding of the
German 'nation', they thought they were offering a kind ofpostnationalistic citizenship
to replace the foreigners' postnational membership, what some scholars, such as Hammar,

have referred to as 'denizenship'. The Government's desire was

10 have

the foreigners'

loyalty to their postnational identity superseded by loyalty to the new citizenship.
Fundamentally, however, the new national membership was still rooted in the German
ethno-cultural understanding of itself because it officially only allowed for a single
citizenship, a central notion in German identity in the past.
Thus, Germany attempted to move away from what it saw as a nationalistic
understanding of citizenship in liberalizing its citizenship law and extending nationality
to foreigners. It seems that for policymakers, the official opposition to dual citizenship
should not detract attention from the fact that there has been some liberalization of
naturalization policies. Rather, attention should be given to the steps taken in new
naturalization policies to distance them from the former ethno-cultural understanding of
citizenship. Green agrees, and writes that "the avoidance of dual citizenship does not ipso
facto produce an increase in ethno-culturalism" (Green, 2000: 117), but maintains that it

may dissuade foreigners from applying for citizenship. However, without the allocation
of dual citizenship, the foreigners who had lived in the country for a long period may
have perceived the paradigm shift as still being anchored in German nationalism,
especially since the Red-Green coalition had publicly stated that allowing dual
citizenship was one of the reform's initial goals. Ultimately, the extension ofnational
membership offered to the foreign population in Germany demands the acceptance of the
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German notion of national membership, which is not desired by most foreigners in the
country. It is undesirable for many foreigners because it retains relics, in the form of
opposition to dual citizenship, from Germany's ethno-cultural understanding of itself as
nation. It is suggested that this, what this study shall refer to as national self
understanding, is a major contributor to the goals-outcomes gap .
With reference to this national self-understanding, it is now possible to clarify the
above-mentioned statement that the governmental domestic pressure, in fact, created the
domestic pressure from the population, and not vice versa as it may appear. The
underlying question that this raises is: does the Government shape public opinion on the
subject of immigration, or does the public opinion influence political party ideology?
There is some definite overlap, but fundamentally, the Government, both Federal and
State, has fashioned policy on foreigners since the creation of the Federal Republic.
Referring to history, this can be clarified. Policymakers drafted the Basic Law that bas
served as the Federal Republic's constitution since its creation in 1949. Furthermore, it
was the policyrnakers who chose not to integrate foreigners into German society, even
during the economic boom of the 1950s and 1960s when the foreign population was
perceived very favorably. And it was the Government that, for decades, proclaimed
Germany was not a country of immigration.
The culture of naturalization was neither developed nor fostered by policymakers
in Germany. In comparison, in Canada where immigration and a multicultural society are
cornerstones of national self-understanding, 84 percent of eligible foreigners have the
Canadian passport (Statistics Canada, 2004). The expectation that foreigners will
naturalize is accompanied by their desire to do so. In the United States, also a country
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with a history of immigration, naturalization occurs at a ceremony headed by civil
servants; it is seen as an event to celebrate and perhaps creates a greater attachment to the
country. In comparison, the Federal Republic gives a naturalized citizen a piece of paper
after the individual has declared its loyalty to the constitution. By declaring Germany not
to be a country of immigration for so many years, the policymakers in Germany clearly
did not foster a culture of naturalization. With the recent paradigm shift., it seems that
policymakers may need to concretely undertake actions, in contrast to veiling the reality
of dual citizenship, in order to instill the change within German society. Ifit is, in fact,
the Government that shapes public opinion on foreigners, then why has the recent
paradigm shift not been widely accepted in society?
There are two answers to this question. The first is that a paradigm shift, or more
specific to the discussion a shift in opinion among the public, is slow in showing itself,
particularly when the previous paradigm had been present longer than the country has
existed. Secondly, the paradigm shift has,not been widely accepted because the
governmental policy does not reflect it. As has been demonstrated, the citizenship reform
still contains ethno-cultural remnants. Furthermore, the other component of the paradigm
shift within the country, the 2004 Immigration Law, brought DO major changes to
previous policy. Thus, when the realities on the ground do not change, it is more difficult
to accept statements decreeing a paradigm shift.

This echoes one of Hagedorn's ideas, namely that with regards to the issue of dual
citizenship, there is a dichotomy between the real circumstances and what is discussed.
Hagedorn, author of a monumental work on French and German naturalization, identifies
such terms as 'loyalty', 'national identity' and 'value of citizenship' in the policymakers'
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discourse in Germany during the last decade that are used to oppose dual citizenship
(Hagedorn, 2001: 180-210). However, the reality is that many foreigners are actually
being granted dual citizenship. Similarly, policymakers speak of a paradigm shift in
Germany when, in fact, the reality is that the shift may not be paradigmatic at all. The
difference between these two examples is that in the first, policymakers use their
discourse to conceal something that is present, namely dual citizenship, whereas in the
second example, the discourse attempts to hide something that is not there, namely the
policy shift.

4.6 Future research
Since the reform of the citizenship law is only five years old , its results are just
now starting to be observable. With a glance towards the future, some issues concerning
citizenship in Germany should be closely monitored in the years to come. The first, and
perhaps the most important, concerns the history of the Federal Republic. The national
self-understanding was found to be rooted in Germany's past, yet this is a past that is
much older than is immigration in Germany, let alone the claims of Germany being an
immigration country. How long, then, does it take for a paradigm shift to occur? And
does it ever fully occur, infiltrating all segments of society?
More research needs to be done specifically on the foreign population's perceived
benefits of a German passport. This study has shed some light on the subject, but is
limited in its scope in that a large, representative number of individual foreigners was not
surveyed. Furthermore, an analysis of the results of the law should be undertaken when
more time since the adoption of the reform has elapsed. This later investigation is
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suggested for four reasons. Part of the paradigm shift entailed Germany becoming an
immigration country, which was only officially proclaimed with the Immigration Law in
2004. Thus, more time needs to pass in order to see if this paradigm shift fully takes root
within society. With a more positive acceptance of this shift, it may ultimately lead to an
environment more conducive to naturalization.
The second impetus for future research concerns tbe Option Model, where
children born of foreign parents decide between the ages of 18-23 whether they will
retain their German or their parents' passport . If most opt for their parents' passport, it
will represent a substantial shortfall to the reform . However, there has been some
discussion with respect to the issue, questioning the constitutional legality of taking away
the German passport if no choice is officially made, as the Basic Law guarantees that
German citizenship cannot be taken away. As the results will not be seen for at least
another decade, further reform to citizenship in Germany may yet change the present law.
Another rationale for further examination of citizenship in Germany in the future
is that the composition of the foreign population will change. There is still a large
component of first generation guest workers in the country who have lived there for a
long period. Once this generation disappears, and the third and fourth generation
population grows, there may be a greater tie to the German country since the symbols of
the ancestral land, embodied and propagated more by the first generation than by any
other source, will have decreasing influence. For the future generation of foreigners not
being granted German citizenship at birth because their parents did not have the
necessary residence permit, it might entice them to naturalize. For those individuals born
in Germany and being granted two citizenships at birth, the decreasing influence and
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presence of symbols of the ancestral land may lead to them to decide to retain the
German instead of their parents' passport .
Finally, German extension of national membership will be important in the
coming years within the European Union context. With the proposed European
Constitution waiting to be ratified in some member states, the EU has entered yet another
realm of political and social inclusion. If the constitution is ratified, all states would be
bound by the same supranational document that would supersede all national
constitutions. Now that Germany has entered the mainstream with respect to citizenship
policy, the status may remain unaltered for years to come. However. new developments,
most notably the possible entry of Turkey into the Union, may have considerable effects
in the Federal Republic, as its biggest foreign population is of Turkish origin. Gennan
citizenship may then not only become less attractive, to Turks in Berlin, but perhaps even
irrelevant.
With the 1999 Reform to the Citizenship Law, Germany liberalized its previous
outdated policy. The reality of having more than seven million foreigners in the country
could no longer be denied. However, the results of the reform have largely fallen short of
Government expectations. This study holds that the German institutional framework, as
well as national self-understanding played abig role in this goals-outcomes gap. Failure
in policy implementation and poor understanding of the foreign populations' wishes are
other, albeit weaker, contributing factors to the gap.
Germany's case is unusual in that it was the only European country with
substantial immigration that did not previously grant citizenship to foreigners born on the
country's soil, and is still the only one not to allow dual citizenship. As a case study of a
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country trying to hold on to relics of its past in the face of pressure from globalization, in
this case embodied by immigration and the presence of foreigners, it provides some
useful lessons. Specifically, it demonstrates that it may be difficult to bring about radical
change, both in policies and within society. Exclusive to Germany, the 1999 citizenship
reform is representative of other policy reforms undertaken in the last three decades, in
that it produced incremental change, due largely to limits imposed by the country's
institutional structure. The 2004 immigration law repeated much of the adoption process
of the 1999 citizenship law . The initial draft of the 2004 law was not passed in the
Bundesrat, and the final version of the law, which was then drafted through numerous
compromises, virtually adds nothing new to old policies. For the time being, it appears
that certain aspects of the country's history, most notably its self-understanding, are still
present. The desire to adapt to globalization fuelled the wish to naturalize foreigners and
extend national membership, but it was ultimately national self-understanding, a key
component of the country's past, that led to the disappointing results.
-As the quotations at the start of the chapter demonstrates, pride in the country is

very much present in Germany, perhaps even more so than a few decades ago. The
challenge for policymakers in the future may be to separate the notion of 'nation', from
that of 'country' , and finally bury the ethno-cultural remains of the Federal Republic.
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Appendix 1 - Foreign population since 1980

Foreign population 1980 to 2003 1
in 1 000
2
Year
Total
Male
Female
1980
4566.2
2576.2
1 990.0
1981
4 721.1
2647.9
2073.2
1982
4671.8
2589.2
2082.6
1983
4574.2
2514.0
2060.2
1984
4405.52406.2
1 999.3
1985
4481.6
2442.8
2038.8
1986
4661.9
2537.9
2 124.0
1987
4286.5
2366.1
1 920.3
1988
4623.5
2537.2
2086.3
5007.2
1989
2741.1
2266.1
1990
5582.4
3080.6
2501.7
1991
6066.7
3"354.7
2 712.0
1992
3720.6
6669.6
2949.0
1993
6977.5
3866.1
3111.4
3915.5
3202.2
1994
7117.7
7342.8
3315.9
1995
4026.9
1996
7491.7
4088.2
3403.5
1997
7419.0
4022.5
3396.5
1998
7308.5
3945.2
3363.3
7336.1
1999
3938 .1
3398:0
2000
7267.6
3393.4
3874.2
2001
7318.3
3437.2
3881.0
2002
3476.9
7348.0
3871.1
3501.8
7341.8
2003
3840.1
1 Reference day:31.12.
2 1980 to 1989: Former territory of the Federal Republic of Germany;
Source: Results of current population statistics, Statistisches
Bundesamt Deutschland

Last updated on 22 February 2005

104

Appendix 2 - Length of stay of foreign population in Germany

Foreign Population in Germany according to length of stay

31.12.2003
Length of stay
Years

Foreign Population

Total
under 1
1-4
4-6
6-8
8 -10
10 -15
15 -20
20-25
25-30
30 and more
Updated 15 April 2004

7334765
314428
951 645
576885
527628
508250
1 349898
633554
545903
535122
1 391 452

Source: Statistisches Bundesamt Deutschland
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Appendix 3 - Foreign population by country of origin

Foreign population on 31.12.2003 by country of origin
of it
Country of Citizenship
Total
born abroad born in Germany
Europe
Belgium
23649
20292
3357
!Denmark
21 568
20031
1 537
!Finland
15748
14995
753
;France
113023
101 525
11 498
Greece
354630
259886
94744
Ireland
15478
14662
816
Italy
601 258
428074
173 184
Luxembourg
6904
5996
908
Netherlands
118680
83330
35350
Austria
189466
160941
28525
Portugal
130623
105126
25497
19404
18177
1 227
Sweden
125977
96026
29951
Spain
113578
102784
10794
United Kingdom
1 431 845
418141
EU states, total 1 849986
I

Albania
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Bulgaria
Estonia
Former Yugoslavia 1
Croatia
Latvia
Lithuania
Macedonia
Norway
Poland
Romania
Russian Federation
Switzerland
Slovakia
Slovenia

11 513
167081
44300
4220
568240
236570
9341
13985
61 019
7546
326882
89104
173480
38501
19567
21 795

9896
139542
43363
4059
455733
185922
8899
13583
47437
7087
309991
86856
168850
31 132
19 112
17695

1 617
27539
937
161
112507
50648
442
402
13582
459
16891
2248
4630
7369
455
4100
106

30186
Czech Republic
1 877661
Turkey
Ukraine
125998
Hungary
54 714
Rest of Europe
68740
Europe total 5800429
Non-European 1 463579
Africa
Algeria
16974
Ghana
23963
79794
Morocco
Tunisia
24533
Africa, total
310943
America
5742
Argentina
United States
112939
America, total 228499
~ia
Afghanistan
65830
China
76743
India
43566
Iran, Islam. Republic of
81 495
Lebanon
46812
Pakistan
35081
Sri Lanka
41 062
Viet Nam
88208
Asia, total 911 995

29372
1 222808
121 950
52230
65702
4473064
1 313526

814
654 853
4048
2484
3038
1 327365
150053

15533
20981
63024
19876
268176

1 441
2982
16770
4657
42767

5573
105817
218218

169
7122
10281

57565
73495
41 001
74443
34 169
30034
32137
69592
815494

8265
3248
2565
7052
12643
5047
8925
18616
96501

Stateless
16990
11 763
5227
Unclear and missing data
53767
17354
36413
Total 7334765
5834766
1499999
I Serbia and Montenegro.
Source: Central Register on Foreigners, Statistisches Bundesamt
Deutschland

Last updated on 22 February 2005
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Appendix 4 - Unemployment in Germany since 1979

Year

Gennan
Unemployment
Unemployment Of foreigners
1979
3.2
3.9
1980
3.5
4.8
1981
5.4
8.5
1982
7.5
11.8
1983
8.6
13.7
1984
8.6
12.7
1985
8.7
13.1
1986
8.2
13.0
1987
8.4
14.1
1988
8.1
13.9
1989
7.3
11.2
1990
10.1
6.6
1991
6.0
10.6
1992
6.5
12.3
1993
8.3
15.3
15.5
1994
8.8
1995
9.0
16.2
18.6
1996
10.0
10.7
19.7
1997
9.8
18.3
1998
19.7
1999
11.2
Source: Bundesanstalt fUr Arbeit . Arbeitslosenquoten ausliindischer Arbeitnehmer nach
Herkunftsldndern. (Auslanderbeauftragte, 2001: Tabelle 33).
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Appendix 5 - Foreign percentage of total population and
naturalization rate since 1982
Year

1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
. 1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001

Percentage
of tota!
population
7.6
7.4
7.1
7.2
7.4
6.9
7.3
7.7
8.4
7.3
8.0
8.5
8.6
8.8
8.9
9.0
8.9

Naturalization
rate (%)

8.9
8.9

1.9
2.6
2.4

8.9

0.3
0.3
0.3
0.3
0.3
0.3
0.4
0.4
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.6
0.9
1.0
1.2
1.1

1.5

Source: Statistisches Bundearnt
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